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HOMESTEAD AND THE PROCESS OF HISTORY: THE
PROPOSED CHANGES IN ARTICLE X, SECTION 4
DENNIS J. WALL*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said that the exemption from forced sale' of a home
and the land upon which it stands is a creature unique to the consti-
tutions and statutes of the American states.' It has also been said
that the common law knew of only one exemption from execution3
and subsequent forced sale in order to satisfy one's debts: an exemp-
tion for the clothes on one's back.' Both these statements are inac-
* B.A. 1973, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1977, University of Florida College of Law.
Member, The Florida Bar.
The author is indebted to Professor Mandell Glicksberg of the University of Florida College
of Law for reviewing the several drafts of this article, although the author takes sole responsi-
bility for any errors and for all statements herein; to Alaine Williams and Ruth L. Gokel,
whose editorial guidance has been greatly appreciated; and to Dianne McTaggart, without
whose assistance and encouragement this article could not have been written.
1. A forced sale is "a sale made by virtue of a legal process," H. HERMAN, TREATISE ON
THE LAw OF EXECUTIONS 86 (1876), without the consent of the owner. See Patterson v. Taylor,
15 Fla. 336, 341-44 (1875) (discussing various definitions of this term).
2. Crosby & Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption: 1-ll, 2
U. FLA. L. REV. 12, 13 (1949); Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1289
(1950); Comment, Creation of the Homestead And Its Requirements, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 241,
241 (1938); Note, Our Legal Chameleon is a Sacred Cow: Alienation of Homestead Under the
1968 Constitution, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 701, 702 (1972); Note, The Homestead Exemption in
Wyoming, 16 Wyo. L.J. 81, 81 (1961); see H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 86-87. At least one
Florida court has fallen into this fallacy, calling the homestead exemption an "institution
of purely American origin. In re Estate of Van Meter, 214 So. 2d 639, 643 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1968).
3. "Execution" is the procedure by which the sheriff or other officer empowered by law
takes possession of the real or personal property of a person adjudged by a court to owe a
debt which has not been paid. Execution occurs pursuant to a court order to execute or make
good the order of repayment. See Davidson v. Seegar, 15 Fla. 671, 676, 678-79 (1876); David-
son v. Floyd, 15 Fla. 667, 670 (1876).
"Levy" is a term used to describe the action of the sheriff or other officer, in which the
officer seizes the defendant's property, in effect causing the judgment to be "levied" or
"placed upon" the property of the judgment debtor. The act of posting real property in order
to give notice of an impending official auction furnishes a vivid illustration of one aspect of
this official conduct. For discussion of various aspects of levy, execution, and forced sale, see
Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. 292, 336-37, 1 Pet. 386, 443 (1828); Moseley v. Edwards,
2 Fla. 429, 438 (1849); Gersten v. Bessemer, 352 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Comment, Homestead Exemption: What Protection for the Widow and Heirs?, 22 U. FLA.
L. REV. 321, 322-23 (1969).
4. For example, Herman put it as follows: "The common law was very niggardly of these
exemptions; it allowed only the necessary wearing apparel of the debtor, and if he had two
gowns, the officer might seize and sell one." H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 86; accord, C.
CRANDALL, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE IN ACTIONS AT LAW IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS AND SUPREME
COURT OF FLORIDA 850 (1928); see Cooke v. Gibbs, 3 Mass. 193, 198 (1807) ("[A] fieri facias
at common law is issued against the goods and chattels of the debtor without any exception;
but if the sheriff were to strip the debtor's wearing apparel from his body, he would be a
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curate. This article will examine the changes to the homestead pro-
visions of the Florida Constitution 5 proposed by the Constitution
Revision Commission, but only after an examination of the histori-
cal background. In this way, perhaps the current generation of
judges, lawyers, and citizens might, when called upon to argue and
vote about this state's homestead law, avoid the mistake of declar-
ing wrong modern law on the basis of wrong ancient history.,
The analysis begins with the treatment of executions upon per-
sons and upon real and personal property in Roman law, then dis-
cusses the influence of Roman law on the laws of England and
Spain, including an inquiry into the independently based law of
those two jurisdictions. With this basis, the article examines the
origins and development of homestead law in the United States.
Against this historical background, the analysis concludes with a
change-by-change inquiry into precisely what Floridians would be
saying by adopting the homestead proposals made by the Constitu-
tion Revision Commission as part of Florida's fundamental law. For
those impatient with history and with why things are as they are,
this last section may be read alone.
II. THE TREATMENT OF DEBTORS UNDER ROMAN LAW
The law of the Romans, especially in the first centuries of the
Republic, treated a debt as attaching to the person of the debtor.,
trespasser, for such apparel, when worn, is not liable to the execution. Also, by the statute of
1805, c. 100, certain chattels therein described cannot be attached. ... ); Bowne v. Witt,
19 Wend. 475, 475-76, 13 N.Y.C.L. Rep. 676, 676 (Sup. Ct. 1838) (stating that since the
defendant debtor was not a householder and therefore could not claim the protection of the
statute, no remedy existed for seizure of his coat by a constable pursuant to court order);
Schwanz v. Teper, 223 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Wis. 1974) (stating that "the right of a debtor to
hold his property free from claims of creditors is not a common-law right"). At least one
author has complained that such statements assert a rule which "is certainly neither to be
tolerated by humanity or justified by law." Stonex, Common Law Exemptions, 9 CENT. L.J.
2, 3 (1879). He noted that he had found not a single reported case in which this proposition
formed the basis of decision and that it was not supported by "the early authorities." Id.
5. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4. The term "homestead" as used in this article refers to the
provisions found in many state constitutions and in the statutes of most states exempting
certain personal property, real property, and buildings from levy, execution, and forced sale
in specified cases. The context will indicate when real or personal property is meant. There
have been many attempts to define "homestead" and "exempt homestead," and the author
is loath to add yet another definition to the list. For a sampling of the various definitions,
see Oliver v. Snowden, 18 Fla. 823, 834-36 (1882); Solary v. Hewlett, 18 Fla. 756, 759 (1882);
Schwanz v. Teper, 223 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Wis. 1974); Dame, The Homestead Exemption
Amendment, 9 FLA. L.J. 399, 403 (1935); Note, Our Legal Chameleon is a Sacred Cow:
Alienation of Homestead Under the 1968 Constitution, 24 U. FLA. L. Rav. 701, 702-03 & nn.
12-13 (1972); Comment, Homestead: Family Headship, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 102, 103 (1954).
6. See Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, 14 L.Q. REv. 291, 291 (1898)
("wrong ancient history may lead to the declaration of wrong modem law").
7. J. HADLEY, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAw 246 (1884).
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The debtor pledged his body, not his property, as security for the
debt.' Thus, under the law of the Twelve Tables, the first codifica-
tion of early Roman law, published in 451 and 450, B.C.,9 if a debtor
could not repay, he paid-literally-with his body.
It worked this way: after judicial determination that the debtor
could not satisfy his creditors, he was declared an "infamous" per-
son and was denied certain rights, much as convicted felons in Flor-
ida today lose certain rights. 0 Absent a general agreement between
the debtor and his creditors, the creditors could not reach the
debtor's property." Instead, after the creditors had complied with
the specified procedures, they could exercise one of two options. The
first was to sell the debtor's body "beyond the Tiber"; that is, into
slavery. 12 The other option was to divide his body among all the
creditors, 3 the law providing that if one creditor hewed off a larger
portion of the debtor's body than was due him, he should not be
punished."
Both these options were removed from the law by statute in 313
B.C., apparently leaving creditors with only one option: imprison-
8. Id. at 247; see O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 14-15 (1881) (stating that the "quasi
material conception of legal obligations as binding the offending body" was conceived in
Roman law to very literally "inhere in or bind the body").
9. R. Some, THE INsTrruTEs OF ROMAN LAW 24, 210-11 (4th ed. J. Ledlie trans. 1892); see
Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 L.Q. REV. 13, 14 (1898) (stating that
this Roman law had held sway for upwards of four centuries prior to the Roman invasion of
Britain in 55 B.C.).
10. Infamy is discussed in B C. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 40-41 (1917).
As to Florida's treatment of convicted felons with regard to the exercise of civil rights, see
FLA. CoNsT., art. VI, § 4, providing that no person convicted of a felony "shall be qualified
to vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights," and 1978 FLA. OP. Avr'Y GEN. 078-45,
setting forth the Florida law regarding suspension of civil rights upon conviction of a felony.
11. J. HADLEY, supra note 7, at 246.
12. See 11 C. SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 280 n.1.
13. J. HADLEY, supra note 7, at 246; O.W. HOLMES, supra note 8, at 14; H C. SHERMAN,
supra note 10, at 280 n.1.
14. The sixth section of the Third Table provided as follows: "VI. Law. If the debtor be
insolvent to several creditors, let his body be cut in pieces on the third market-day. It may
be cut into more or fewer pieces with impunity: Or, if his creditors consent to it, let him be
sold to foreigners beyond the Tiber." Fragments of the Twelve Tables, in THE INSTITUTES OF
JusTINIAN 665 app. I (3d ed. T. Cooper trans. 1852) [hereinafter cited as Cooper] (emphasis
in original). Whether or not this law was ever followed, and whether it was to be taken
literally, was at one time a matter of some disagreement. For example, Thomas Cooper, one
of the early English translators of the Justinian Code, took the position that "doubt yet
remains whether the literal be not the true sense. Probably it was a law in terrorem only."
Id. at 650. Montesquieu also took this position. I J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
*521 n.b. (13th ed. 1884). However, the great weight of historical authority today holds that
this provision was taken quite literally. Id.; see O.W. HOLMES, supra note 8, at 14. It appears
that the severity of the Third Table "was designed to compel the debtor to redeem himself,
or to enter into a nexurn, by which he became liable to pay interest, and to work out his debt
by labor." I J. KENT, supra at *521 n.b.
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ment of the debtor. 5 Some two centuries later, however, an alterna-
tive to the debtor's prison was introduced in the form of involuntary
bankruptcy."6 The debtor still suffered the penalties of infamy, but
for the first time in Roman law, a creditor could enforce his judg-
ment against the debtor by levying upon and forcing the sale of the
debtor's property, both real and personal."7 There were no exemp-
tions from this new form of execution, and the debtor "was not
released from the liability of having his after-acquired property
seized and sold, until the old debts of his creditors were fully satis-
fied.""8
Julius Caesar took this procedure one step farther during the Civil
Wars, a period when credit was hard to get and debts went unpaid,
by introducing the idea of voluntary bankruptcy. 19 To encourage the
use of voluntary bankruptcy in which the debtor voluntarily as-
signed all his real and personal property to his creditors, Roman law
by 223 A.D. provided for exemptions from imprisonment and in-
famy for those debtors who used this procedure.2 More important
for our purposes, later Roman law provided that a debtor entering
into voluntary bankruptcy did not have to use all his after-acquired
property to pay off his creditors, but could set aside a portion to
provide for his own support.2'
This was the first instance of a property exemption of any type
since the idea of levying executions upon a debtor's property had
been introduced into Roman law one century before Christ. It ap-
pears to have been a fairly successful means of satisfying judgment
creditors, for less than a century after this property exemption had
been fully enacted, imprisonment for debt was all but abolished by
15. R. SOHM, supra note 9, at 210; see II C. SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 280 & n.2. It should
perhaps be remembered that detention in prison was humane in comparison with dismember-
ment of the body.
16. II C. SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 280 & n.3. The date appears to have been circa 105
B.C. Id.
17. Id. at 280-82.
18. Id. at 281-82. Still, it was better than prison.
19. See J. CAESAR, THE CIVIL WAR 106 (J. Mitchell trans. 1967); J. CAESAR, THE WAR
COMMENTARIES OF CAESAR 278 (R. Warner trans. 1960); II C. SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 284
& n.27. But see R. SOHM, supra note 9, at 211 (stating that the idea was "probably" intro-
duced by Augustus Caesar). Caesar recounted two purposes for his action: he "thought it the
most effective way to remove or lessen the fear of a total abolition of debts which usually
accompanies wars or civil wars, and to preserve the credit of debtors." J. CAESAR, THE CIVIL
WAR, supra at 106.
20. R. SOHM, supra note 9, at 211; see II C. SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 284 & nn. 29-30.
21. II C. SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 284 & n.31; see Cooper, supra note 14, at 650
(comparing Roman law codified under Justinian with the English law forbidding "the tools
and instruments of a man's trade to be seized").
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Constantine the Great.22 This remained the law of the Romans until
the end of the Empire, the time of Emperor Justinian,23 whose codif-
cation of Roman law forms the basis of the civil law.4
Several points should be kept in mind as we turn to English
common law. First, the idea of forcing the sale of a debtor's property
to pay creditors was a reform, a humane alternative to imprison-
ment for debt, which in turn was a (comparatively) humane alterna-
tive to dismemberment of the debtor. Second, it was in Roman law
that the idea of exempting a portion of the debtor's property from
the creditor's reach first appeared, and then only to the extent per-
mitted by the sovereign's written code of laws. Finally, this property
exemption, which entered Roman law between 223 and 533 A.D.,
the latter being the year of publication of the Justinian Code,25
applied to all debtors without distinction.6
Im. THE TREATMENT OF DEBTORS UNDER ENGLISH COMMON LAw
The Romans first entered Britain, led by Julius Caesar, in 55
B.C.27 They, and their laws, remained in force in Britain until the
middle of the fifth century, when the Saxons successfully invaded
England. 2 Roman law, together with the law of the Saxons, was the
basis of the earliest English common law.29
22. II C. SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 280 & n.3. The year was 320 A.D. Imprisonment was
still allowed for those debtors who were able to pay but refused to do so. Id.
23. See id. at 284. Book IV, Title VI, Chapter 40 of the Institutes of Justinian, translated
in THE INSTITrrEs OF JUsTINIAN 541 (T. Sandars trans. 1876), provided as follows:
So, when a debtor who has made a cession of his goods to his creditors acquires
a fortune which makes it worth their while, the creditors may compel him by action
to pay as much as he is able, but no more, for it would be inhuman to condemn a
man to pay the whole debt who has already been deprived of all his property.
24. See text accompanying notes 66-67 infra; I J. WHITE, LAND LAW IN CALIFORNIA, ORE-
GON, TEXAS & c. ix (1839).
25. J. HADLEY, supra note 7, at 17.
26. See note 23 supra.
27. I C. SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 345.
28. In I C. SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 347, it is stated that the Roman forces occupying
Britain were withdrawn in 455 A.D. to protect Italy from Germanic invasions. In Lefroy, The
Anglo-Saxon Period of English Law, 26 YALE L.J. 291, 291 (1917), the statement is made that
the Roman occupation of Britain terminated in 410 A.D. Mr. Lefroy's work bears heavy
indications of extensive plagiarizing of Pollock, supra note 6. Compare Lefroy, supra at 303,
with Pollock, supra note 6, at 296. Interestingly enough, Lefroy did not cite to Pollock's
article, written 19 years earlier, even once. Since the authenticity of scholarship in Mr.
Lefroy's article is in doubt, the authority of his work is equally in doubt.
29. See I J. KENT, supra note 14, at *546 n.f. The well-known historical English aversion
to foreign influence upon the common law for a long time prevented the recognition of Roman
influences upon the English system of law. As stated by Kent in 1884, "[a] national preju-
dice was early formed against the civil law, and it was too much cultivated by English lawyers
.... But the more liberal spirit of modem times has justly appreciated the intrinsic merit
of the Roman system." Id. at *546. Thus, in 1845, England adopted a statute, protecting the
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The Saxons not only partially replaced the Roman law with their
own, but also they replaced the Roman desire for discipline and
codification with a strong spirit of independence. The Saxon courts
could not compel the attendance of any defendant, let alone a judg-
ment debtor. In order to force a defendant to come to court, the
person who brought the suit had to resort to self-help by taking the
defendant's personal property (usually cattle) until he came to
court. 0 If the defendant still refused to appear, he could be
"outlawed" by the court,3' which involved consequences similar to
that of the Roman practice of infamy.3 Since the court could not
even compel a defendant's attendance, it is no surprise that it also
could not force a defendant to pay a debt.3
The arrival of the Normans in 1066 did little to displace the Saxon
laws, for the Normans arrived in Britain with little written law of
their own .3 The Saxon method of civil procedure and the ideas
behind it survived and formed the basis of later common law proce-
dure.35 This is important because the Normans-who were aware of
Roman law as set forth in the Justinian Code-did not attempt to
replant the Roman law regarding creditor's rights. Thus, while the
early common law did develop methods of forcing the sale of a
debtor's personal property to satisfy the debt, there was, neverthe-
less, no means by which a creditor might levy upon the land of a
debtor. While this was due primarily to the rigid system of feudal
land ownership, it was due also, it is submitted, in part to the Saxon
"wearing apparel, bedding, tools and implements of trade" from execution, apparently with-
out regard to the writ pursuant to which the levy was made. Rombauer, Debtors' Exemption
Statutes-Revision Ideas, 36 WASH. L. REv. 484, 485 n.8 (1961). This was in line with the
philosophy behind the Roman proceedings in voluntary bankruptcy.
30. Pollock, supra note 6, at 296. This was called "distress" or "distreint." Id. Distress
was also used-and regulated-under the early common law as a method of self-help by
bringing pressure to bear upon a debtor to pay a debt: "The idea of distress (districtio) is
that of bringing compulsion to bear upon a person who is thereby to be forced into doing
something or leaving something undone; it is not a means whereby the distrainor can satisfy
the debt that is due him." I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGuSH LAW 353
(2d. ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MArrILAND].
31. Pollock, supra note 6, at 296.
32. As to the Roman practice of infamy, see note 10 and accompanying text supra.
33. I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 30, at 355; see Pollock, supra note 6, at 303:
There was not [under Saxon law] any law of contract at all, as we now under-
stand it. . . . Apart from the general sanctions of the Church, and the king's
special authority where his peace had been declared, the only ways of adding any
definite security to a promise were oath and giving of pledges.
34. I POLLOCK & MArrLAND, supra note 30, at 65. In the area of property rights and
succession, however, the Normans did gradually replace the existing law-with laws designed
in part for the peculiar situation of their British subjects, in part derived from the Justinian
Code. Pollock, supra note 6, at 306.
35. Pollock, supra note 6, at 297.
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concept of security within the boundaries of one's own land:
"[elvery free man was entitled to peace in his own house, the
sanctity of the homestead being one of the most ancient and general
principles of Teutonic law."3
At any rate, three ways were soon developed at common law by
which a creditor could compel payment of a debt from a judgment
debtor.3' The first was by executing the debt upon the person of the
debtor, by use of the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. This writ
directed the sheriff to bring the defendant into court, where he
would be asked to pay the debt; if he did not or could not then do
so, he would be kept in custody until he did.38 This procedure could
be used against any common man.3"
Subsequently, a statutory alternative analogous to the Roman
procedure for voluntary bankruptcy was provided. 0 Provision was
made for any judgment debtor owing less than one hundred pounds
to avoid imprisonment by surrendering all his personal property to
his creditors, with one exemption, and with his after-acquired prop-
36. Id. at 301; cf. I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 30, at 352-53, regarding the remedies
available in the thirteenth century to a lord for his tenant's failure to render services: "Such
then is our common law, and it is well worthy of remark; it does not turn out the tenant from
the land because he can not or will not perform his services." (Emphasis added.) The idea
that the homestead was a place to be protected from the outside world provided the founda-
tion for what came to be called "the King's peace": order and the rule of law within the king's
house and courts, upon the king's roads, and eventually throughout his entire kingdom. Id.
at 45; Pollock, supra note 6, at 301. This idea also appears to have been one motivation for
the homestead exemption in Florida. See Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 84 So. 190, 192 (Fla. 1920):
"The homestead right is not limited to a mere holding of the legal title to the exempt property
'from forced sale'; it contemplates and includes the beneficial, peaceful, and uninterrupted
use and enjoyment of such property."
37. Three additional ways, given by statute, were by writ of extent or extendi facias upon
a statute merchant, statute staple, or a recognizance in the nature of a statute staple. 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 (Phila. 1771) (1st ed. London 1766)
[hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES; volume 3 was first published in 1768, and
volume 4 in 1769]; 3 id. at 420; M. HALE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL PART OF THE LAW 134-35
(5th ed. n.p.n.d.), reprinted in II M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (5th ed. London
1794). Each was a method by which the debtor effectively pledged his person, goods, and land
to secure payment of the debt. Upon default, the debtor was liable to be imprisoned, and
the creditor took the debtor's lands and chattels-but only until the debt was paid from the
rents and profits of the lands and chattels, at which time the debtor was released and his
property returned to him. The statute merchant and statute staple were available only to
merchants, but the recognizance in the nature of a statute staple extended the availability
of the above procedure to anyone, pursuant to the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c.6 (1531). See 2
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra at 160; 3 id. at 420.
38. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 414-15; SMITH, ELEMENTARY VIEW OF
THE PROCEEDINGS IN AN ACTION AT LAW, excerpted in READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF
THE COMMON LAW 446 (3d ed. R. Pound & T. Plucknett 1927).
39. The writ did not apply to privileged persons, peers, members of Parliament, executors,
administrators, or to "such other persons as could not be originally held to bail." 3
BLACKSTOE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 414; see SMITH, supra note 38, at 446.
40. 32 Geo. II, c. 28, §§ 13-26 (1758).
HOMESTEAD AND HISTORY
erty being subject to execution if the debt was not satisfied." The
one statutory exemption allowed the debtor to retain his clothing,
bedding, and the tools of his trade, up to a value of ten pounds. 2 If
the creditor accepted this statutory alternative, the debtor could
never be sent to prison. If he insisted that the debtor remain in
custody, the debtor was to be allowed a specific sum for each day
of the imprisonment until the debt was paid. 3
The second common law method of judicially compelling pay-
ment by a judgment debtor was execution upon his goods and chat-
tels using the writ of fieri facias." This writ could be employed
against all persons, even "against executors or administrators with
regard to the goods of the deceased."' 5 The writ commanded the
sheriff to sell the judgment debtor's personal property until the
judgment was satisfied," with the exception of the debtor's
"necessary wearing apparel" and the produce of farming land grown
by the debtor for the benefit of his landlord. 7
The third method of execution, by writ of levari facias, was simi-
lar to the writ of fieri facias in that it directed the sheriff "to levy
the plaintiff's debt on the lands and goods of the defendant"; that
is, to seize the defendant's goods and receive all rents and profits
from his lands, but only until the defendant made satisfaction to the
plaintiff." Unlike the writ of fieri facias, the debtor's goods could not
be sold. Once the debt was satisfied, the debtor's goods and the
rents and profits from his lands were returned to him."
These, then, were the three writs of execution available to judg-
ment creditors under the early common law. None of these three
writs allowed a creditor to attach the debtor's lands.
By a statute of Edward I in 1285, a judgment creditor could take
possession of a "moiety," or one half, of the debtor's lands and
tenements. 50 This was done pursuant to a writ of elegit or "election,"
a statutorily afforded alternative to the three common law writs just
described.5' However, this action could be taken only if the debtor's
41. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 416.
42. Id.; Stonex, Common Law Exemptions, 9 CENT. L.J. 2, 3 (1879).
43. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 416; see SMITH, supra note 38, at 447.
44. See M. HALE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL PART OF THE LAW, supra note 37, at 134; SMITH,
supra note 38, at 445.
45. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 417.
46. Id.; C. CRANDAUL, supra note 4, at 840, 849; SMITH, supra note 38, at 445-46.
47. SMITH, supra note 38, at 445-46.
48. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 417.
49. Id. at 418.
50. Union Bank v. Heirs & Terretenants of Powell, 3 Fla. 175, 196 (1850); 2 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 161; SMITH, supra note 38, at 447.
51. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 418; SMITH, supra note 38, at 447.
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goods and chattels produced insufficient revenue to satisfy the
debt,52 for "[t]o take away his land might deprive him of his means
of livelihood; for chattels could not yield a permanent revenue." 53
Further, the creditor's possession of both lands and chattels lasted
only until the debt was repaid, at which time the debtor could
retake possession of his property. Besides one half of the lands, the
debtor's "oxen and beasts of the plough" were immune from this
form of execution.5 4
Several points about this elective method of execution should be
kept in mind. This was the first time in English law that a judgment
creditor could take possession of any part of his debtor's lands for
even the slightest period of time, and it remained the law of England
until the American Revolution:
[T]ill this statute, by the ancient common law, lands were not
liable to be charged with, or seised for, debts; because by this
means the connection between lord and tenant might be destroyed,
fraudulent alienations might be made, and the services [due the
lord] be transferred to be performed by a stranger; provided the
tenant incurred a large debt, sufficient to cover the land. And
therefore, even by this statute, only one half was, and now is,
subject to execution; that out of the remainder sufficient might be
left for the lord to distrein upon for his services."
In addition, as will be noted from the preceding quotation, the
reason only one half of the debtor's lands could be taken is traceable
in part to the feudal system of landholding, in which all freeholders
owed several duties or "services" to their lord.51 Maintenance of the
Like the two last-mentioned writs, the purpose behind elegit seems not only to have been to
help satisfy creditors, but to afford alternatives to the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. Cf.
Williams, Creditors' Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Traditional Rights, 25
U. FtA. L. REV. 60, 62 (1972):
Whatever stigmas its detractors may now ascribe to prejudgment garnishment and
attachment, the early use of the process in England, both before and after the
abolishment of imprisonment for debt, compelled the appearance of the defendant
by the attachment of his property in lieu of his body, and must necessarily be
characterized as relatively benign.
52. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 418-19; SMITH, supra note 38, at 447-
48.
53. W. McKE cmz, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN
222 (2d ed. 1914).
54. 3 BLACKSTONE's COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 418-19; SMITH, supra note 38, at 447-
48.
55. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 419; see 4 id. at 419-20; Curry v.
Lehman, 47 So. 18, 21 (Fla. 1908): "At common law a judgment was not a lien on real estate.
The matter of creating and controlling the lien of judgments is entirely the creature of statute,
and the extent and operation of the same are fixed by statute."
56. Services due to the lord were of three basic types: "fealty," or fidelity, to the lord;
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feudal system required restrictions on involuntary as well as volun-
tary transfers of land in order to keep land in identifiable hands, so
that the lord would not be deprived of the services which were
rightfully his.5" Another contributing factor appears to have been
the Saxon concept of the sanctity of the homestead, for the Saxons
were practicing a primitive feudal system before the Normans
brought their more refined views to English lands.58
Despite such strong bases for restraints on alienation, whether
voluntary or involuntary, by Edward's time the restraints had to be
loosened to the extent that creditors could be paid, "for the benefit
of trade and commerce . . . . " For the promulgation of this and
similar statutes, which together molded the law of England down
to the time of the American Revolution, ® Edward has been called
an "English Justinian,"'" after the great Roman lawgiver whose
work Edward appears to have imitated to some degree."
Moreover, debts due the king had a greater claim of right to
repayment pursuant to the writ of elegit than debts due to mere
mortals, much as "the payment of taxes and assessments" on the
Florida homestead cannot be defeated or delayed by a claim of
homestead exemption. 3 The Magna Carta allowed the king to take
possession of all a debtor's lands under the writ,"' until the debt was
paid.65
"suit of court," involving such matters as availability for jury service on the lord's court; and
rent. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 230.
57. Id. at 418-19; 2 id. at 161.
58. 2 id. at 90; I POLLOCK & MAMAND, supra note 30, at 66-73.
59. 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 161; see I M. HALE, Supra note 37,
at 275. The writs of statute merchant and statute staple were made available at the same
time and for the same reasons. 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 160; 4 id. at
419.
60. See 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 419; 4 id. at 420; I M. HAIE, supra
note 37, at 277.
61. 4 BLACEKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 418; I M. HALE, supra note 37, at
271.
62. There is at least one clear instance of Edward's acceptance of his Roman predecessor
as a model. The writ of cessavit per biennium allowed the landlord to claim his tenant's land
if the tenant fell into arrears in the payment of rent over a two-year period, exactly in
accordance with the Roman procedure under the Justinian Code. 3 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 232 & n.g; I POLLOCK & MATLAND, supra note 30, at 353 &
n.2.
63. FIA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
64. Chapter 9 of the Magna Carta provides: "Neither we nor our bailiffs shall seize any
land or rent for any debt, so long as the chattels of the debtor are sufficient to repay the
debt .... " W. McKEcHNIE, supra note 53, at 221.
65. 3 BIACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 419. The idea was that the king could
never be defrauded of the services due him, "when the ouster of the vassal proceeded from
his own command." Id. But see W. McKEcHNIE, supra note 53, at 222-23, where the author
19781
888 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:877
Finally, the exemptions from execution under each of the various
writs were available to all debtors. Nowhere in the English law of
execution as it existed in 1776 does there appear a requirement that
the judgment debtor be the head of a family in order to claim the
available exemptions.
IV. THE TREATMENT OF DEBTORS UNDER SPANISH LAW UNTIL THE
TIME OF THE TEXAS REPUBLIC
The Spanish law reflects an extension of the Justinian Code over
the course of several centuries of experience. Broadly stated, Span-
ish law did not suffer the comparatively large break with Roman
thought and tradition that English law did.6 In contrast to the
English experience, Spanish law underwent a fresh transfusion of
rediscovered Roman codifications in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries. 7 By the late eighteenth century, the Spanish Civil Code
provided that the houses of knights (caballeros) and noblemen (hi-
josdalgos) could not be taken in execution except for the payment
of debts owed to the king. Spanish law in general, 9 and Spanish
law relating to debtors' rights in particular,'" has had a marked
effect on the development of law in the United States. Indeed, the
Spanish Civil Code was in effect in Florida until 1823, 71 in California
seems to imply that the king's action in such a case was something of an escheat, with the
debtor being permanently deprived of any rights in the land.
66. See Rombauer, supra note 29, at 485.
67. G. SCHMT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MExico 66-67 (New Orleans 1851); J.T.
VANCE, THE BACKGROUND OF HISPANIc-AMERicAN LAW 87 (1943).
68. m 1. Aso & M. MANUEL, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF SPAIN (Annotated) tit. X, ch. 1, §
4, reprinted in I J. WHrrE, supra note 24, at 322. The Institutes appear to have been published
in 1771. Rombauer, supra note 29, at 485 n.11. Judge Johnson, the annotator of the version
of the Institutes which is republished in I J. WHITE, supra note 24, has noted that, despite
the language of this exemption, the practice was to levy on the houses of caballeros and hi-
josdalgo when no other property was available to satisfy the debt. Id. at 322 n.18. In any
event, the exemption appears to have been repealed in 1822. Id. at 323 n.18. Mr. White's
compilation of the laws of Spain was commissioned by President John Quincy Adams and
authorized by Congress shortly after the cession of Florida to America from Spain, Mr. White
having been a distinguished citizen of Florida in his day. His compilations have been viewed
by the Florida courts as authoritatively laying down the law of Spain which was in force in
Florida prior to its cession to the United States. See MaGee v. Doe, 9 Fla. 382, 398 (1861), in
which the Florida Supreme Court, in a case decided shortly before secession, stated that
White's compilations had been accepted as law in the area of married women's property.
69. See I C. SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 294-95; note 71 infra.
70. I C. SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 295; see Rombauer, supra note 29, at 485, stating that
"[t]he Spanish code exemptions became the basis for all state exemptions."
71. In 1822, the Florida Territorial Legislative Council adopted the "common law of
England and the statutes in aid thereof, down to the fourth year of James I" (1607), effective
in East Florida from October 1, 1822, reenacted the succeeding year effective throughout the
entire territory. Hart v. Bostwick, 14 Fla. 162, 173 (1872). The "laws and ordinances" re-
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until about 1850,2 and in Texas until 1840.11
The most important effect of Spanish law on the American law
of debtors' rights is that the real and personal property exemption
provisions of the civil code, noted in part above, contained no "head
of family" requirement. For example, in Cobbs v. Coleman, in 1855,
the Texas Supreme Court was called upon to apply a statute passed
in 1839, still in force in Texas at the time of decision, which ex-
empted certain personal property owned by every "citizen or head
of family" from execution." The court held that the benefit of the
statute was available to a single man, pointing to several of the
specific exemptions previously available in Texas under the Spanish
Civil Code. The court reasoned as follows:
It is very clear that no distinction, in this Act, is made between
single men and heads of families. . . . It may be well to observe
that at the passage of the Act of 1839, the laws of Spain were in
force, and by these, there were many exemptions .... Nothing is
said about single men or heads of families [in the Spanish Civil
Code]."
Similarly, the Republic of Texas in 1839 was the first "American"
jurisdiction to provide for the protection of homestead realty." The
Texas exemption contained the "head of a family" feature common
to the contemporary personalty exemption laws of the northeastern
states. However, like the personal property exemptions considered
by the Cobbs court, the Texas exemption was also available to any
pealed by these acts "were the laws of Spain that were continued in force in the Floridas by
the proclamation and the ordinances promulgated in 1821 by Major General Andrew Jackson,
governor of the provinces of the Floridas." Whitfield, Whitfield's Notes-Division 2, 211, 224,
in III FLA. STAT. 1941 (1946). By the act of November 6, 1829, the English common and
statutory law to July 4, 1776, of general-as opposed to local-nature were made effective
throughout Florida, with the exception of such laws as were inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion and statutes of the United States and the acts of the Florida Legislature (variously
referred to over time as the Florida Legislative Council and the Florida General Assembly).
Id.; THOMPSON'S DIGEST OF THE LAws OF FLORIDA 21 (L. Thompson, Boston 1847). Despite these
enactments, the influence of the Spanish Civil Code was still felt in Florida law. For example,
by the terms of the Act of December 23, 1824, which was brought forward in unaltered form
up to FLA. STAT. § 708.01 (1969), it was provided that since the law regarding married women's
property rights was in a state of disarray, the Spanish Civil Code was to be considered the
law of Florida in this area. THOMPSON'S DIGEST.OF THE LAwS OF FLORIDA, supra at 220-21. This
act was not repealed until October 1, 1970. Ch. 70-4, § 4, 1970 Fla. Laws 66.
72. I C. SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 295 & n.14.
73. Id. at 295 n..
74. 14 Tex. 594, 597 (1855).
75. Id. at 598.
76. R. WAPLES, A TREATISE ON HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 221 (1893); Note, Principles for
Modernizing the Connecticut Debtors' Exemption Statute, 6 CONN. L. Rlv. 142, 156 (1973).
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other citizen of the Texas Republic," just as the Spanish Civil Code
had exempted the houses of knights and noblemen without regard
to familial status. In this sense, the Spanish Civil Code forms the
basis of American homestead law. 8
It would seem that the revision commission's proposal to elimi-
nate the "head of family" requirement for the homestead exemption
in Florida is something of a return to the law which was in force
when Florida was a Spanish possession. Whether the proposed
changes are in line with the historical growth of American home-
stead law will be discussed after a consideration of the history of
homestead exemptions in America.
V. THE TREATMENT OF DEBTORS IN AMERIcAN HOMESTEAD LAW
The development of American homestead law is intimately con-
nected with geography and economics. As a result, the most striking
feature of the various state homestead exemptions-both real and
personal-is their diversity. 7 For example, regarding personal prop-
erty, a nineteenth century Massachusetts statute exempting certain
enumerated personal property was available to any debtor,10 while
a similar New York statute, limited to property "owned by any
77. See note 125 infra.
78. See Rombauer, supra note 29, at 485, where it is stated, without citation of authority,
that "[t]he Spanish code exemptions became the basis for all state exemptions." It is in-
teresting to note, therefore, that while one of the major purposes of the American homestead
laws has been the attraction of settlers, especially via the "head of a family" requirement,
see text accompanying notes 102, 105 and 126-31 infra, Spain was somewhat reluctant to
attract emigrants to its American colonies, or at least those types of emmigrants whose loyalty
to the Spanish crown would be doubtful. See II J. WHrrE, supra note 24, at 365, for the tale
of a scheme to attract Irish families to Florida in 1790, the scheme having gone awry when
the Captain General of Cuba and the Floridas adhered strictly to the letter of the following
royal edict: "[Rieceive only those strangers, who, of their own accord, shall present them-
selves to swear allegiance to his majesty, and to them concede and reserve lands gratis, in
proportion to the workers in every family." (Emphasis added.) Needless to say, no true Irish
man or woman would have forsworn liberty in exchange for land.
79. The federal statutes reflect this diversity. While the Consumer Credit Protection Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1976) (setting a maximum on allowable garnishment of the earnings of any
"individual," plus establishing exceptions thereto), and the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
407 (1970) (exempting federal old age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits payments
to "any person" from execution "or other legal process" and from "the operation of any
bankruptcy or insolvency law"), are broad exemption laws because applicable to individual
debtors, the federal law providing for an exemption from tax on the in-home production of
wine is restricted to the "head of any family," 26 id. § 5042(a)(2), and has been administra-
tively interpreted in a manner akin to the interpretation of "head of a family" under various
state homestead laws. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 240.540-.543 (1977).
80. Cf. Cooke v. Gibbs, 3 Mass. 193, 198 (1807) (Parsons, C.J., stating that the statutory
exemptions available to debtors, without qualification, did not have to be set forth in the writ
of attachment).
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person being a householder," was early held to be unavailable to a
single man who was not in charge of a family.8' Some states in the
middle and latter parts of the nineteenth century exempted de-
scribed personal property and no more, while other states provided
a monetary maximum on their personal property exemptions and
left the debtor to choose the property to be exempted.8 2
Florida has done both. In 1843, the Territorial Legislative Council
exempted "the necessary wearing apparel and bedding of every per-
son," 83 and "one set of working tools or instruments of every me-
chanic, artist, dentist, artisan or tradesman, not exceeding in value
one hundred dollars, 84 among other items. In 1866, the Florida
General Assembly added "the professional books and libraries of all
professional men, not exceeding three hundred dollars in value," to
the list of personal property which was exempted from forced sale. 85
Two years later, the Florida Constitution for the first time set forth
a homestead exemption, "supplant[ing] entirely all previous statu-
tory exemptions. 8' This exemption provided in part that such per-
sonal property owned by the head of a family "as he or she may
select, to the amount of one thousand dollars," would be exempt
from forced sale.87 "The Constitution of 1868 [was] intended to
enlarge the privilege of claiming exemptions. 8 8 It has remained
essentially the law of Florida until the present .8
Given the diversity of homestead laws, including the changes
made in a given state's law from decade to decade or year to year,
it might seem that very few generalizations could be made. 0 But the
81. Bowne v. Witt, 19 Wend. 475, 475-76, 13 N.Y.C.L. Rep. 676 (Sup. Ct. 1838):
The word "householder," in this statute, means the head, master or person who has
the charge of and provides for a family, and does not apply to the subordinate
members or inmates of the household. Mrs. Bowne [plaintiff's mother] was evi-
dently the head of this family, and the plaintiff cannot maintain the exemption of
his cloak on the ground that he was a householder. . .. The exemption cannot be
extended to his clothing upon any ground which will not make the provision nearly
or quite universal, for most persons live in some family.
That the statute was nonetheless to be construed "liberally" is shown by the later case of
Bowman v. Quackenboss, 3 Code Rep. 17 (N.Y. Com. P1. 1850), in which the court held that
the exemption law's protections ought not to be denied a woman who made her living as a
brothelkeeper, so long as "she really had a family which she was bound to provide for .. "
82. See H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 94-111 (reviewing the personal property exemptions
of the various states as they stood in 1876).
83. Act No. LXV, § 1 (March 15, 1843).
84. Id. § 2.
85. Ch. 1481, § 2, 1866 Fla. Laws 44.
86. Miller v. Finegan, 7 So. 140, 141 (Fla. 1890).
87. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2.
88. Alexander v. Kilpatrick, 14 Fla. 450, 461 (1874).
89. See FLA. CONST. art X, § 4. The Constitution Revision Commission has proposed that
the limit on this exemption be raised to $3,000. See text accompanying notes 234-42 infra.
90. Cf. Smith v. Guckenheimer, 27 So. 900, 914 (Fla. 1900), in which the Florida Supreme
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truth is that the history of American homestead law is part of an
ever-expanding process of providing additional protection for debt-
ors-a process which has continued since the Romans first decided
to imprison debtors rather than dismember them." Admittedly, this
protection has both expanded and contracted a bit since the law of
the Twelve Tables was repealed. Nonetheless, debtor protection has
on the whole been strengthened. And the Florida homestead has not
been sheltered from this process.
Different regions of the nation have progressed at different rates,
however. The northeastern states appear, as a general rule, to have
afforded less protection over time than the states in the West and
South,92 perhaps because of "the traditional pro-commerce, and
hence pro-creditor, attitudes of that region." 3 In addition, the
northeasten states have always been densely populated relative to
Court stated that the homestead exemption provision of Florida's organic law as embodied
in the 1885 constitution "differs materially from the homestead provisions of all the other
states," so that little if any light would be shed by reference to "the divers decisions of our
sister states upon their varying provisions of law on the same subject"; and McDougall v.
Meginniss, 21 Fla. 362, 369-72 (1885), in which the court, called upon to interpret the
homestead exemption of the 1868 constitution, distinguished numerous cases construing
the provisions of other states. Despite such broad pronouncements, the Florida courts have
looked to the constructions placed on other states' homestead laws. E.g., Osceola Fertilizer
Co. v. Sauls, 123 So. 780, 780-81 (Fla. 1929); Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 562 (1884);
In re Estate of Kionka, 113 So. 2d 603, 606-07 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959), affd, 121 So. 2d
644 (Fla. 1960).
91. See R. POUND, THE SpnTrr OF THE COMMON LAW 187-88 (1921) (stating that the Ameri-
can homestead exemptions restrict "the power of the creditor to secure satisfaction" in a
fashion reminiscent of classical Roman law).
92. H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 114-15; Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO.
L.J. 779, 782-83 (1974); see R. WAPLES, supra note 76, at 231 (setting forth the differing
monetary limitations on the homestead realty exemption); Haskins, supra note 2, at 1309 &
nn.166-67 (urban states such as New York and New Jersey have generally not exempted crops
raised on the homestead while comparatively agricultural states such as Georgia and Virginia
have); cf. Williams, supra note 51, at 63, in which it is stated that the process of attachment
and garnishment in American colonial times was extended in the New England colonies to
tangible personalty and real property in the defendant's possession and that other states
adopted the New England example to suit their own peculiar conditions:
Of particular significance in the New England development of these provisional
remedies was their eventual emergence as a collection remedy or judicially imposed
security device whereby the attached property was not released upon the appear-
ance of the defendant but would stand charged with any judgment that might be
rendered against him. . . .Those inroads on the restrictions contained in the pri-
mordial process embodying direct attachment of the property in the debtor's pos-
session as well as the continued availability of the property for satisfaction of any
judgment obtained have found common acceptance in the jurisdictions of this
country outside of New England. However, the other jurisdictions have generally
limited both direct attachment and garnishment of property or credits in the hands
of third parties to special grounds rejecting the reasoning that these extraordinary
remedies should be available against all debtors generally.
93. Vukowich, supra note 92, at 782 n.15; see Note, Principles for Modernizing the Con-
necticut Debtors' Exemption Statute, 6 CONN. L. REv. 142, 152 n.58 (1973).
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other areas of the nation. It may be that personalty exemptions, for
example, had to be restricted to the "necessaries" of life because of
the sheer numbers of potential debtors.9' Comparatively restrictive
exemptions from execution on land would appear to be a logical
product of the fact that there simply was not that much land to be
owned in the first place. 5 In addition, in urban areas the homestead
is frequently only a residence and not a means of producing in-
come." This would also explain the differentiation between urban
and rural landholdings in the homestead law of many other states,
such as Florida,"7 where the urban homestead is given far less pro-
tection than the rural homestead."
In contrast, the homestead protections afforded by the western
states have been comparatively liberal. One reason is that debtor
exemption laws in those states were enacted in response to hard
times.9 Another is that urban creditors were less than welcome in
the predominantly rural western states of the nineteenth century.'1
And yet another reason can be found in the influence of the Spanish
Civil Code on the law of some western states. '0 However, it appears
that the primary reason for liberal homestead protections in the
West was the need to attract settlers. 0 2
94. See H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 94-111 (reviewing the personalty exemptions avail-
able in the various states in 1876); Vukowich, supra note 92, at 782 (stating that the person-
alty exemptions available in the northeastern states parallel a (supposedly) "restrictive Eng-
lish exemption policy").
95. See H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 127-35 (reviewing the homestead realty exemptions
available in the several states in 1876). Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1260 (Deering Supp. 1977)
($30,000 limitation on homestead realty for heads of families and persons over age 65; $15,000
for all others) and KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 9 (160 acres of "farming land," one acre in a
municipality) with N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 5206 (McKinney Supp. 1977) (exempting either a
"lot of land with a dwelling unit thereon," or "shares of stock in a cooperative apartment
corporation," or "units of a condominium apartment," all subject to a $10,000 limitation in
value) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (1977) ("dwelling house, outbuildings and the land
used in connection therewith, not exceeding $5,000 in value," plus the "rents, issues, profits
and products thereof"). But compare GA. CODE § 2-123 (1976) ($1,600 limitation on home-
stead realty and personalty combined) with MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 188, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-
op 1976) ($30,000 limitation on homestead realty).
96. Haskins, supra note 2, at 1309.
97. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (if located within a municipality, one-half acre limited
to the owner's residence or his family's; otherwise, 160 acres).
98. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. X, § 205 (exemption of up to 80 acres outside a municipality
and, by judicial construction, up to $2,000 in value; up to $2,000 if in a municipality); KAN.
CONST. art. 15, § 9 (exemption of 160 acres of "farming land"; one acre in a municipality).
This rural-urban distinction has existed for some time. See R. WAPLES, supra note 76, at 221
n.1 (setting forth the laws of Florida, Kansas, Wisconsin, and Minnesota).
99. Vukowich, supra note 92, at 783 & nn.16-17.
100. Id. at 783 & n.19.
101. Id. at n.18; see Rombauer, supra note 29, at 485.
102. H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 114-15, 120; Haskins, supra note 2, at 1289-90; Vukow-
ich, supra note 92, at 783; see Rombauer, supra note 29, at 485-86 (the "extensive list of
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After the Civil War, the southern states enacted homestead laws
based on the liberal provisions in the west'03 and for the same rea-
sons. Besides the influence of the Spanish Civil Code'04 and a dislike
for urban creditors similar to that found in the western states, the
primary reasons for liberalizing the homestead exemption in the
south were tight credit, poverty, and a need to attract both investors
and settlers in the aftermath of a war fought mainly on southern
soil.105 As the Florida Supreme Court stated in 1875:
All the courts are constrained to sustain the exemption laws
upon grounds of public policy and humanity. These considerations
doubtless controlled in the framing of our Constitution [of 1868].
If there ever existed a people requiring protection of this character
at the time of the adoption of that instrument, that people inhab-
ited these Southern States, just emerged from a long and destruc-
tive war. Nearly all were poor-many entirely destitute-and
many having only the soil of their former flourishing plantations
and homes, without money, without farming implements or stock,
and all practically at the mercy of creditors, whose demands prob-
ably exceeded the then cash value of the productive lands in these
States. Capital had gone elsewhere, and but for the means brought
from afar to aid them, our planters were utterly helpless. . . . The
laboring classes were equally destitute and dependent upon the
making of crops.'"6
However, in order to limit the available exemptions to families,
since families put down roots and contribute to local commerce, 07
the western and southern states alike provided that the person
claiming the exemption be the "head of a family" or a "house-
exemptions available to all debtors" under the Spanish Civil Code was redrawn in the Ameri-
can homestead exemptions to protect only families). The federal government reacted to this
need in the form of the Homestead Act of 1862, which "encouraged settlement by offering
land at nominal prices and by providing that the land was exempt from debts contracted prior
to the official grant of land." Vukowich, supra note 92, at 783; see notes 126-27 infra.
103. H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 114-15, 120. The southern states during Reconstruction
appear to have generally referred to the constitutions of the western states as models for their
own "reconstructed" organic law. For example, much of the 1868 Florida Constitution was
"taken from the Constitution of the State of Nevada." In re Executive Commun., 13 Fla. 687,
695 (1870) (Westcott, J.).
104. As to the influence of the Spanish Civil Code upon Texas debtor exemption statutes,
for example, see Rombauer, supra note 29, at 486 n.14.
105. See H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 115, 120 (southern states adopted the liberal exemp-
tions of the western homestead laws as part of their own policies of Reconstruction); Vukow-
ich, supra note 92, at 783 & n.16.
106. Patterson v. Taylor, 15 Fla. 336, 345-46 (1875).
107. See Note, Principles for Modernizing the Connecticut Debtors' Exemption Statute,
6 CONN. L. Rlv. 142, 156 (1973) (one purpose and effect of homestead laws is to encourage
stability of population).
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holder."'' 8 While this requirement appeared earlier in the debtor
exemption statutes of some northeastern states,109 and for the same
purpose, namely protection of the family,"0 in those states it had
the pronounced effect of narrowing the scope of the few exemptions
that were available by limiting the number of persons who could
claim their protection."'
VI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FLORIDA HOMESTEAD LAW
Florida provides a prime example of the trend toward liberaliza-
tion of the homestead per se, or homestead realty, as well as the
"homestead" personalty exemption, coupled with an eventual limi-
tation of these liberal benefits to the "head of a family." First, in
1822 and 1823, the Territorial Legislative Council replaced the
Spanish Civil Code with "[t]he common law of England and the
statutes in aid thereof," insofar as these were not inconsistent with
the United States Constitution and statutes, nor with statutes en-
acted by the Territorial Legislative Council." 2 Then, in 1828, the
108. See Haskins, supra note 2, at 1289 ("[tihe principal objective of the homestead laws
is generally regarded as the security of the family"); Vukowich, supra note 92, at 784, 841.
109. For example, New York. See Bowne v. Witt, 19 Wend. 475, 475, 13 N.Y.C.L. Rep.
676, 676 (Sup. Ct. 1838); Woodward v. Murray, 18 Johns. 400, 401 n.1, 6 N.Y.C.L. Rep. 632,
632 n.1. (Sup. Ct. 1820). By 1876, only two states allowed the personal property exemption,
for example, to be claimed by one not the head of a family: Texas (all persons) and Pennsyl-
vania (bachelors). H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 89.
110. For example, in Woodward v. Murray, 18 Johns. 400, 6 N.Y.C.L. Rep. 632 (Sup. Ct.
1820), the court construed a statute exempting certain enumerated personal property "owned
by any person being a householder" as follows:
According to the lexicographers, household means "a family living together," and
a "householder," "a master of a family." Sacred scripture, in the same sense,
declares "he that provideth not for his own household, is worse than an infidel." I
think it clear that the Legislature meant to confer this privilege on each of those
little primary communities called families.
Id. at 402-03, 6 N.Y.C.L. Rep. at 632 (emphasis added); accord, Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22
N.Y. 249, 252 (1860); see Bowman v. Quackenboss, 3 Code Rep. 17, 17 (N.Y. Com. Pl. 1850):
[A] woman who keeps a house of prostitution merely cannot be considered as a
person having a family to provide for, within the meaning of the exemption law.
When that is shown to be the case, with no other persons in her family to be
provided for, she could not be entitled to the exemption. If she really had a family
which she was bound to provide for, the fact of her improper mode of living would
not deprive her of a right to which she was otherwise entitled. [Emphasis added.]
111. In Bowne v. Witt, 19 Wend. 475, 13 N.Y.C.L. Rep. 676 (Sup. Ct. 1838), for example,
the plaintiff had sued in replevin to recover a cloak taken from him by the defendant Witt.
The defendant replied that he had done so as a constable pursuant to a writ of execution. In
affirming the trial court's entry of judgment upon a jury verdict in favor of the defendant
Witt, the court declared that since the plaintiff was not a "householder," he could not claim
the benefits of the exemption statute: "The exemption cannot be extended to his clothing'
upon any ground which will not make the provision nearly or quite universal, for most persons
live in some family." Id. at 476, 13 N.Y.C.L. Rep. at 676.
112. Hart v. Bostwick, 14 Fla. 162, 173 (1872). The Acts of 1822 and 1823 introduced only
so much of the English law as had developed down to the fourth year of the reign of James I;
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writ of capias ad satisfaciendum was abolished by statute so that
the debtor no longer had to answer for his debts with his body.13
Between 1822 and 1834, the writ of elegit was the only means of
levying judgment upon a debtor's realty."4 In 1834, the Territorial
Legislative Council provided that every judgment rendered by a
Florida court would constitute a lien on all the defendant's real
estate." 5 This provision was reinforced in clear terms by an act
passed in 1844: "Lands and tenements, goods and chattels, shall be
subject to the payment of debts, and shall be liable to be taken in
execution and sold."" 16
Thus, while the writ of elegit was in force, levy could be had only
on half the debtor's lands, and the creditor could take possession of
only that one-half of his debtor's realty until the debt was repaid.
But, after 1834, all the debtor's realty-without exemption-was
subject to forced sale to pay his debts. This retreat from the protec-
tions afforded debtors under the common law apparently did not go
unnoticed. In 1845, the Territorial Legislative Council provided that
"every farmer seized and possessed of forty acres of land in his
or her own right in fee simple," at least ten acres of which were
in cultivation, "shall hold the same free and exempt from
in 1829, the common and statutory law of England down to July 4, 1776, was adopted, with
the same proviso as that noted in the text. See note 71 supra.
113. Act of Nov. 23, 1828, § 53, THOMPSON'S DIGEST OF THE LAwS OF FLORIDA § 1, at 354
(L. Thompson Boston 1847).
114. See Union Bank v. Heirs & Terretenants of Powell, 3 Fla. 175, 196 (1850):
The 18th chapter of 13 Edward 1st, which gives the elegit, is not in force in this
State, because it is inconsistent with divers provisions of the acts of our General
Assembly, and especially those which provide for the sale of land on execution ...
The act of 12th February, 1834, [THOMPsON's DIGESTJ page 350, 357, sec. 4. no. 1,
declares, that "every judgment at law and decree in equity which shall be entered
and pronounced in any of the Courts of this State, shall create a lien and be binding
upon the real estate of the defendant or defendants."
The effect of a lien is to confer "a right to levy," and "[tihe only remedy of the judgment-
creditor is against the thing [or land] itself, by making that a specific title, which was before
a general lien," pursuant to a writ of execution and subsequent forced sale. The judgment-
creditor "can only claim the proceeds of the sale of the land, when it has been sold on his
own execution, and ought to be applied to [the debt's] satisfaction." Conard v. Atlantic Ins.
Co., 26 U.S. 292, 336-37, 1 Pet. 386, 443 (1828); accord, Moseley v. Edwards, 2 Fla. 429, 438
(1849). See generally C. CRANDALL, supra note 4, § 546. Therefore, the writ of elegit was
inconsistent with the Act of February 12, 1834, quoted above by the Union Bank court,
because the maximum extent of the right granted by the writ was the temporary possession
of one-half of the debtor's lands and tenements. The Act of February 12, 1834 granted a
lien-enforceable by execution and forced sale-upon all of the lands owned by the debtor.
C. CRANDALL, supra note 4, § 541, at 840; see Union Bank v. Heirs & Terretenants of Powell,
3 Fla. 175.
115. Act of February 12, 1834, § § 1-4, THOMPSON'S DIGEST OF THE LAWs OF FLORIDA § 1, at
351-52 (L. Thompson Boston 1847); see note 114 supra.
116. Act of March 15, 1844, § 1, BusH's DIGEST OF THE LAwS OF FLORIDA 325 (A. Bush
Tallahassee 1872).
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Execution[,] attachment or distress . . . [pirovided the land and
improvements does [sic] not exceed in value two hundred dollars
. . "" This exemption worked well enough that in 1851 the legis-
lature of the by then State of Florida extended the Act of 1845
so as to grant a similar exemption, under the same restrictions,
(except as to the requisition that he shall "actually have in cultiva-
tion at least ten acres" of land,) to every owner of a dwelling house
and the lot on which the same stands, in any city, town or village
of this State: Provided, Said owner shall actually reside in said
house: And Provided, The value of said house and lot shall not
exceed three hundred dollars."'
The Florida Legislature continued its expansion of these protec-
tions in 1866 by increasing the monetary maximum on all home-
steads to $1,000,111 continuing the "dwelling house" exemption and
allowing the required occupancy to be that of "the owner or his
family,"' 10 and amending the "forty acres" exemption so as to en-
compass forty acres of land seized and possessed of every farmer "in
his own right in fee simple" when at least five acres were "in cultiva-
tion or productive use .... "I"
In 1868, a homestead provision was included in the Florida Con-
stitution for the first time. 2 This provision changed the limitation
on the urban homestead from a monetary to an acreage limitation
(one-half acre) and further limited the urban homestead to "the
residence and business house of the owner." The framers of the new
constitution also increased the maximum acreage of rural home-
steads to 160 acres, removed the "cultivation or productive use"
restriction, and abolished the limitation of the rural homestead ex-
emption to farmers. And, for the first time in Florida history, the
117. Act of March 11, 1845, § 1, 1845 Fla. Laws 23. Note that the exemption was available
to both sexes and was without apparent reference to familial status. This latter inference is
buttressed by the fact that, although § 1 of the act provided that a portion of the land worth
up to $200 be set aside and "exempted from sale and reserved for the use of said family" where
the entire tract was valued at more than $200, § 2 provided that if the owner of such lands
died leaving "no issue or widow then the same shall be subject to his or her debts." Since
one's parents, for example, are not one's "issue" but are still part of one's "family," it clearly
appears that the intent of this act was not limited to the protection of families. It was
primarily intended to protect the individual debtor.
118. Ch. 376, § 1, 1851 Fla. Laws 125 (emphasis in original). It will be noted that there
was still no requirement that the "owner" be male, female, or the head of a family.
119. Ch. 1481, §§ 2, 4, 1866 Fla. Laws 44.
120. Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
121. Id. § 4. That the phrase "seized and possessed of forty acres of land in his own right"
was not meant to exclude women nor to be limited to heads of families is shown by the fact
that this exemption was available to "[elvery farmer." Id.
122. Crosby & Miller, supra note 2, at 14 & n.10.
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homestead exemption (rural and urban) was restricted to "the head
of a family.""'
The minutes of the 1868 Constitutional Convention do not reflect
the reasons for these changes,'24 but the history of the times supplies
some of the answers. The Congress of the Republic of Texas, in
1839-for the first time in any American jurisdiction-had
"reserved to every citizen, or head of a family in this Republic, free
and independent of the power of a writ of fieri facias or other execu-
tion," a homestead of fifty acres or one town lot, including certain
personal property.'25 In 1862, the United States Congress apparently
took a leaf from the Texas book. The Homestead Act of 1862 pro-
vided that "any person who is the head of a family, or who has
arrived at the age of twenty-one years," would be entitled to "enter
one quarter section [160 acres] or a less quantity of unappropriated
public lands ... " 2
The purpose of the Homestead Act was to encourage the "actual
settlement and cultivation" of lands in the federal public domain.,"
Clearly borrowing from the federal example, the Constitutional
Convention of 1868 authorized the Florida Legislature to "provide
for the donation of the public lands to actual settlers," with a limi-
tation of 160 acres to any one person. 2 ' The desire to attract settlers
123. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1. This section also exempted $1,000 worth of personal
property, in addition to the $1,000 worth of personal property exempted under art. IX, § 2.
124. The four members of the Committee on Homestead delivered their report on the
homestead article on Thursday, February 20, 1868. JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 91-92 (E. Cheney printer Tallahassee
1868). The article was adopted in substantially the same form on Friday, February 21, 1868,
with no debate reflected in the Journal. Id. at 102. The article was enacted as FLA. CONST. of
1868, art. IX, with some minor changes-such as insertion of the adjective "incorporated"
before the phrase "city or town"-indicating further consideration of the homestead article
not reflected in the Journal.
125. DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF TEXAS app. VIII, at 280-81 (J. Dallam ed. 1845). This act was
repealed and then reenacted in 1840. Id. at 281. The law had changed by 1876, however, for
in that year the Texas Constitution limited the homestead realty exemption to heads of
families. TEx. CONST. of 1876, art. XVI, § 50.
126. Act of May 20, 1862, ch, 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 392. It should be noted that the act
exempted the entered lands only from debts "contracted prior to the issuing of the grant"
for said lands. Id. § 4, at 393. The act is therefore to be distinguished from state homestead
provisions, most of which provide an exemption against all debts, and all of which exempt
the homestead from levy and execution on debts incurred subsequent to acquisition of the
homestead. See Vukowich, supra note 92, at 803.
127. Lewton v. Hower, 18 Fla. 872, 878 (1882). Section 2 of the act required all applicants
to execute an affidavit stating that their entry upon public lands was made for "actual
settlement and cultivation," and the federal courts have noted that the purpose of the act
was to encourage permanent settlement. E.g., Adams v. Church, 193 U.S. 510, 516 (1904);
Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U.S. 483, 487 (1890).
128. JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
FLORIDA 84 (E. Cheney printer Tallahassee 1868) (emphasis added). Two days after this
measure was introduced, a motion was made to limit the acreage to 80 acres. The motion
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seems to have entered into the new homestead article of 1868 as
well, much as it had motivated the enactment of homestead exemp-
tions in other states. In 1882, the Florida Supreme Court, noting
that the purpose of the Federal Homestead Act was "actual settle-
ment and cultivation" of land, stated that "[tihe act of Congress
exempting from forced sale for debts certain lands granted as a
homestead for the benefit of a family is in full harmony with our
constitutional provisions . ... "I
Apparently because the economic conditions of Reconstruction
were such that immigration was best limited to settlers with fami-
lies-and because the balance in favor of debtors' exemptions could
not be weighted too heavily' 30-the Florida homestead exemption
was made available only to heads of families.' 3' Nevertheless, the
availability of an exemption of up to 160 acres represented a fourfold
increase in the maximum exemption under Florida law. Despite the
fact that the need for family settlement has diminished, and the
need for striking a new balance between creditors' and debtors'
rights has long been apparent,"' the provisions of the 1868 constitu-
tion have remained the fundamental homestead law of Florida.'3
was defeated by a vote of 21-16, and the measure was adopted on the same day. Id. at 102.
This provision became FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XVI, § 11. Clearly, the convention was
determined to attract settlers to Florida. Note that "160 acres of land [was] the usual
quantity for a farm in this country" in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Greeley v.
Scott, 10 F. Cas. 1072, 1072 (C.C.N.D. Fla. 1875).
129. Lewton v. Hower, 18 Fla. 872, 878, 881 (1882).
130. See R. POUND, supra note 91, at 201:
[I]f we ask how far we may trench upon the social interest in the security of
transactions, a fundmental form of the general security in a commercial and in-
dustrial society based upon credit-if we ask how far we may impair this interest
to secure the social interest in the individual life to the extent of preserving a
minimum human life to the debtor, our question becomes one of a compromise that
will secure as much as possible of each with the least sacrifice of either ....
See Crow, The Wisconsin Homestead Exemption Law, 20 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 1 (1935) (stating
that "[ilt is better business, in time of stress, to protect the home than the creditors"); cf.
Patterson v. Taylor, 15 Fla. 336, 346 (1875): "The basis of private pecuniary credit is security
and confidence, and it could not be expected that the merchant would advance his money
and his property with no security and no means of reimbursement." (Emphasis added.)
131. Texas, for example, likewise limited the availability of its homestead realty exemp-
tion in the Reconstruction era. TEx. CONST. of 1876, art. XVI, § 50.
132. See Williams, supra note 51, at 111:
If a realignment of debtor-creditor law requires that the debtor be protected
against unscrupulous creditors, it conversely should require that creditor and public
interests be protected against unscrupulous debtors. Consumerism must advance
beyond the quixotic view so often taken by the media and aspiring politicians that
equates any victory of any consumer over a business interest, regardless of how
unfounded and undeserving, with furtherance of the public interest. The import-
ance of credit to our over-all productivity is deserving of more than passing interest.
133. The constitution of 1885 differed substantially from that of 1868 only in that it
lowered the personal property exemption to a maximum of $1,000 and provided that no
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In different sections of the country, then, the requirement that a
homestead claimant be the head of a family has operated to limit
the availability of the exemption in order to serve different pur-
poses. While the western and southern states sought to attract new
families in order to stimulate their economies, the northeastern
states sought to limit their comparatively meager exemptions to a
class of debtors which would not be all-inclusive. Other historical
purposes of the exemption laws-some of which entered into the
proposals of the Constitution Revision Commission-include main-
taining families in dwellings owned by them (given the lack of avail-
able rental space in the nineteenth century), 3 ' and, concomitantly,
avoiding an increase in the welfare rolls.'3 5 The latter purpose and
effect of exemption laws has repeatedly been referred to by the
Florida courts."' Still another goal of the homestead protections is
the rehabilitiation of debtors, 37 the homestead laws having been
homestead could be reduced without the consent of the owner by reason of subsequent
inclusion within the limits of an incorporated city or town. Compare FiA. CoNs'r. of 1885, art.
X, §§ 1-7 with FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, §§ 1-3. The 1968 constitution eliminated the
"business house" language of the 1885 constitution regarding the urban homestead and is
otherwise in accord with its centennial predecessor. Compare FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 with
FLA. CONST. OF 1868, art. IX, §§ 1-3.
134. Vukowich, supra note 92, at 805, 807; Note, Principles for Modernizing the Connecti-
cut Debtors' Exemption Statute, 6 CONN. L. REv. 142, 156 (1973).
135. Caravaggio v. Retirement Bd., 329 N.E.2d 165, 171 (N.Y. 1975); Vukowich, supra
note 92, at 786; see Haskins, supra note 2, at 1289 (by providing the family with security,
homestead law "prevents pauperism"); Rombauer, supra note 29, at 486 (noting that "to the
extent that a debtor provides for his family or himself, welfare and charitable funds may be
relieved of that burden"). In Caravaggio, Chief Judge Breitel of the New York Court of
Appeals noted that such a purpose exists in many areas of the law:
The policy of protecting an individual against the results of his own improvidence
or misfortune is commonplace in the law. Spendthrift trusts, statutory limitations
on and exemptions from execution, and the like, serve the common good by guard-
ing against the impoverishment of those whose improvidence or misfortune might
otherwise result in a burden upon society as a whole.
329 N.E.2d at 171 (citations omitted).
136. See, e.g., Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So. 2d 792, 794 (Fla. 1954); Patten Package Co. v.
Houser, 136 So. 353, 355 (Fla. 1931); Maryl v. Hernandez, 254 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 255 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1971); First Prudential Bank v. Rolle, 45 Fla.
Supp. 128, 133 (Fla. Palm Beach County Ct. Dec. 23, 1976); see Comment, Florida Home-
stead: Availability of Exemption After Divorce, 3 U. FLA. L. REv. 242, 246 (1950) (stating that
"the basic homestead policy is to minimize the number of public wards").
137. Schoetz, Homestead Law in Wisconsin, 2 MARQ. L. REv. 19, 20 (1917-18); Vukowich,
supra note 92, at 786-87, 826; see Rombauer, supra note 29, at 486-87 (one important result
of "occupational personal property exemptions" is "the guarding of the productive ability
of a debtor for the benefit of all his creditors"). As one court has put it in construing a statute
which applied to "every householder having a family": "This statute was designed for the
benefit of the debtor, and should be liberally construed, so as to effect and not thwart its
object and policy, and, being remedial in its nature and effect, must be so construed." Feldes
v. Duncan, 30 Ill. App. 469, 474 (Ill. App. Ct. 1888) (emphasis added); cf. Altman v. Schune-
man, 273 P. 173, 175 (Wyo. 1929) (homestead protections are designed for the family as a
whole, not for the head of the family alone).
1 HOMESTEAD AND HISTORY
passed at the same time and in the same humane spirit as the laws
abolishing imprisonment for debt.'3 8 Finally, the homestead laws
also provide protection for the family from the improvidence of its
head.' 3 And, not least, the homestead laws encourage home owner-
ship. 140
From the beginning, though, homestead laws were not designed
solely for the benefit and protection of the family unit.14' In jurisdic-
tions where the exemption could be claimed only by the head of a
family, or by a householder, this may have been the primary pur-
pose, as has been frequently proclaimed, for example, by Florida
courts. 4  Even in such states, however, the courts have recognized
138. H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 119-20; Crow, supra note 130, at 1; see II C. SHERMAN,
supra note 10, at 283 (imprisonment for debt generally abolished in England and in the
United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century); Schoetz, supra note 137, at 19
(noting that the first Wisconsin constitution contained successive provisions abolishing im-
prisonment for debt and enacting the homestead exemption). The same motivation was
behind the early English common law when alternatives to the capias ad satisfaciendum were
introduced. See Williams, supra note 51, at 62. But see R. WAPLES, supra note 76, at 3:
"[H]omestead statutes are not poor laws made for the benefit of the impecunious only. They
protect the family homes of all classes. . . . The charitable effects of homestead laws are
merely incidental."
139. E.g., Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249, 252 (1860); H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at
86-87; Comment, Creation of the Homestead and Its Requirements, 26 CALIF. L. REv. 241
(1938).
140. Ford v. Security Nat'l Bank, 105 S.E.2d 421, 424 (N.C. 1958); R. WAPLES, supra note
76, at 29; see Sarahas v. Fenlon, 5 Kan. 360, 361 (1870) (stating that the homestead clause
of the Kansas Constitution is "a provision intended to create inducements for the improve-
ment and advancement of the home"). Waples stated his view of the general purpose
behind the homestead exemption as follows:
The mischief to be met [by homestead laws] is not poverty in general, for the
remedy is given only to holders of real estate who are heads of families, by most of
the homestead statutes; it is not debt-paying, for the law favors the payment of
debts, and the exemption provided is accorded to solvent as well as insolvent
owners. The policy of the homestead laws is the conservation of homes for the good
of the state; . . . the remedy provided is the exemption of occupied family homes
from the hammer of the executioner.
R. WA ILxs, supra at 29.
141. See Feldes v. Duncan, 30 I1. App. 469, 474 (Il. App. Ct. 1888), in which the court
concluded that a homestead statute which made the exemption available to "every house-
holder having a family" was "designed for the benefit of the debtor .... " (Emphasis
added.) To like effect are Schwanz v. Teper, 223 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Wis. 1974), and Altman
v. Schuneman, 273 P. 173, 175 (Wyo. 1929), in which the Wisconsin and Wyoming supreme
courts, respectively, construed homestead laws available only to persons with families, and
in which each court implicitly recognized that such laws serve to protect the one who claims
the exemption in addition to and distinct from the other persons for whom he or she claims
the exemption.
142. E.g., Tullis v. Tullis, 360 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla. 1978); Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely
Ins., Inc., 207 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 1968); Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 562 (1884);
White v. Posick, 150 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963); see Crosby & Miller, supra
note 2, at 14-15 (citing various judicial statements of purpose). The Florida Legislature has
also stated this as the primary purpose behind Florida's homestead exemption: "It is the
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that protection of the individual debtor is one purpose behind all
exemption laws.4 3 In any event, such an explanation of constitu-
tional and statutory design does not explain the enactment of home-
stead laws which do not require the person claiming the exemption
to be the head of a family.4 4
It is submitted that, whatever the wording of a given provision,
the history of property exemption laws shows the plain purpose for
their enactment. They are the product of a sometimes unarticulated
but nevertheless considered policy determination, refined over the
course of two dozen centuries, "to insist not that the debtor keep
faith in all cases even if it ruin him and his family, but that the
creditor must take a risk also-either along with or even in some
cases instead of the debtor.' ' 45 Judges feel, or, what is better, know
declared intention of the Legislature that the purpose of the constitutional exemption of the
homestead is to shelter the family and the surviving spouse, and such purpose should be
carried out in a liberal spirit and in favor of those entitled to the exemption." FLA. STAT. §
222.19(1) (1977). It has been stated by various commentators as an assertion of fact that all
homestead laws have as their "sole" or "principal" focus the protection and furtherance of
the familial structure. E.g., H. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 89; R. WAPLES, supra note 76, at 3,
29, 57; Rombauer, supra note 29, at 485-86; Vukowich, supra note 92, at 784, 841. Thus, it
has been stated that persons of either sex who are not heads of families should not be entitled
to the benefits of a homestead exemption. R. WAPLEs, supra at 79; cf. Dame, supra note 5,
at 402-03 ("[olne person is not a family," and "[tihe Homestead is that place where a
person resides with his family").
143. E.g., Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 136 So. 353, 355 (Fla. 1931); Vandiver v. Vin-
cent, 139 So. 2d 704, 707-08 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962); First Prudential Bank v. Rolle, 45
Fla. Supp. 128, 133 (Fla. Palm Beach County Ct. Dec. 23, 1976).
144. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. X, §§ 204-205 (homestead personalty and realty exemptions
available to "any resident"); N.C. CONST. art. X, § 2(1) (homestead realty exemption open
to one who is an "owner" and a "resident of the State"); TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 49-50
(legislature to exempt personal property owned by "all heads of families, and also of unmar-
ried adults, male and female"; realty exemption protects the "homestead of a family, or of a
single adult person").
145. R. PouND, supra note 91, at 188. As Dean Schoetz put it, referring to the Wisconsin
Legislature's enactment of homestead protections:
The legislature did not intend to relieve debtors from the discharge of the duty
to pay their debts or to interfere with the general power to compel its perform-
ance .... [However,] it was considered better for society at large to withdraw
from creditors so much of that coercive power which had theretofore remained in
their hands, as was requisite to enable debtors, if they choose, by retaining these
necessary comforts, to ameliorate their condition and relieve the public of an unwel-
come burden. Individual happiness and public welfare demanded that forty acres
in the country and one-fourth of an acre in the city be exempt from execution when
used as a homestead.
Schoetz, supra note 137, at 20; see Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 136 So. 353, 355 (Fla. 1931)
(stating that exemption laws should neither be construed so liberally as to apply them to
those not within their purview, nor so strictly as to defeat the statutory object); Hill v. First
Nat'l Bank, 84 So. 190, 192 (Fla. 1920) (stating that the policy of the law conferring the
homestead exemption "is to preserve the home for the family even at the sacrifice of just
demands"); Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 569-71 (1884); cf. Miami Herald Publish-
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this when they are called upon to interpret the language of particu-
lar homestead provisions. They know that constitutions and stat-
utes should be read in the light of the common law, from which
much of the American system of jurisprudence has evolved.'" Yet
they also know-or should know-that land was not subject to
forced sale to satisfy debts at common law, and that this right was
given in America by statute. Because this statutory right of credi-
tors confers a remedy which did not exist at common law, judges
know that such a statute is "remedial" and so is to be construed
liberally to give the remedy the statute was clearly designed to
provide. "I
Yet judges know too that the homestead exemption is also reme-
dial, for it confers a remedy in the form of an exemption from the
gavel of the official auctioneer.'48 Faced with this conflict between
two rules demanding liberal interpretation, most courts appear to
favor the homestead exemption.'49 By stating that the homestead
exemption did not exist at common law, and that the rights con-
ferred thereby are wholly "statutory," the courts have all but ig-
nored the fact that the statute allowing a creditor's judgment to be
a lien on the debtor's lands also confers a remedy unknown at com-
mon law. Since the judicial focus is on the rights of the debtor rather
than on those of the creditor, this conflict is more easily resolved in
the debtor's favor.
This may reflect a change in legal thinking toward "social justice"
and away from "individualist" or "legal justice," so that the home-
stead and other exemption provisions may be viewed in part as the
product of a rational determination to resolve the conflict between
debtor and creditor in favor of the debtor's interests. 50 On the other
ing Co. v. Payne, 358 So. 2d 541, 543 (Fla. 1978) (statutory exemptions from execution are
for the benefit of the debtor).
146. E.g., Meeks v. Johnston, 95 So. 670, 671 (Fla. 1923); Nolan v. Moore, 88 So. 601,
605 (Fla. 1921).
147. This general doctrine has been set forth in such cases as Nolan v. Moore, 88 So. 601,
604-05 (Fla. 1921); Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Meekins, Inc., 219 So. 2d 439, 440 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Pools by Tropicana, Inc. v. Swan, 167 So. 2d 775, 776 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1964).
148. E.g., Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely Ins., Inc., 207 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 1968); Altman v.
Schuneman, 273 P. 173, 175 (Wyo. 1929); R, WAPLES, supra note 76, at 29. Judges also know
that exceptions to these homestead exemptions are to be strictly construed. See, e.g., Quigley
v. Kennedy & Ely Ins., Inc., 207 So. 2d at 432; Graham v. Azar, 204 So. 2d 193, 195 (Fla.
1967).
149. This has been so from the time such laws were enacted. See Stonex, Common Law
Exemptions, 9 CENT. L.J. 2, 5 (1879), stating that the prevailing opinion, which was mistaken,
seemed to be "that statutory exemptions are in derogation of the common law," but that such
exemptions nevertheless "are always to be liberally construed."
150. R. POUND, supra note 91, at 187-88.
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hand, it may also in part be a reflection of the judicial realization,
consciously in those cases decided in the early years of the republic,
but subconsciously and dimly perceived in most cases decided
today, that the common law creditor could never obtain immediate
title to the lands of his judgment debtor, but only the right Qf imme-
diate possession and use-and then only of half the judgment
debtor's lands until the debt was paid.
Whether and to what extent the homestead proposals of the Con-
stitution Revision Commission reflect the continuing historical lib-
eralization of exemption laws-and for what purposes-is the sub-
ject of the final section of this article.
VII. PROPOSED CHANGES IN ARTICLE X, SECTION 4
The proposed changes of the Constitution Revision Commission
relating to homestead would be made in article X, section 4, subsec-
tion (a), parts (1) and (2) of the present constitution.' 1 In sum, 152
in section 4(a)(1), (1) "the head of a family" would be replaced by
"any natural person"; (2) the current 160-acre exemption for land
"located outside a municipality" would be replaced by a reference
merely to acreage "used for agricultural purposes"; (3) the limit of
one-half acre for a homestead not used for agricultural purposes
would be increased to one acre; and (4) a "mobile or modular home"
would be treated as a homestead. In section 4(a)(2), the personal
property exemption would be increased from $1,000 to $3,000. Each
of these changes will be discussed in turn.
A. "Natural Person"
Commissioner Yvonne Burkholz proposed the elimination of the
"head of a family" requirement to make the homestead exemption
available to "any natural person.' ' 3 She explained her purpose in
offering this amendment as follows:
151. The commission also proposes the elimination of the present § 1 of article X. If the
voters approve, the present § 4 will be renumbered 3. For purposes of clarity, present § 4 will
continue to be referred to herein as § 4.
152. See Appendix to this issue for the full text of the proposed changes.
153. There apparently is a great deal of interest in this phrase as employed throughout
the entire proposed 1978 revision of the Florida Constitution. On April 7, 1978, for example,
the author received a telephone inquiry from a woman who identified herself as a member of
"Parents of Gays." She wanted to know whether the phrase "natural person" meant that the
judiciary could find her homosexual son to be an "unnatural person" and therefore not
entitled to the various constitutional protections in which the term "natural person(s)" is
employed.
It should be noted that this change, as originally proposed, did not contain the modifying
term "natuial." See Fla. C.R.C., Proposal 196 (by Yvonne Burkholz); Transcript of Fla.
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The current language requires that a person to be eligible for an
exemption be the head of a family. And I guess it comes as no
surprise that there are an enormous number of divorces in this
state which create split households. And that particular number
is on the increase.
There has been a great deal of litigation on whether or not the
divorced person is, in fact, the head of a household. The require-
ments are varied, and many depend upon the age of the children.
Therefore, in this era of attempting to deal with all persons equally
and with the full recognition that the sociological foundations of
society have changed, and that may be regrettable as it is and may
be unfortunate, but what we are asking you to do here is deal with
the facts of life.
There are many single women who are heads of households,
although they may not qualify as such under the present constitu-
tional construction and the statutes which flow from it.'5'
The possibility that a single person might be entitled to the home-
stead exemption is not new in Florida. 15 5 What has been required is
that the person claiming the exemption be the head of a family, 5
C.R.C. proceedings 152 (Jan. 11, 1978) (reading of Proposal 196 by the commission secretary).
This term was inserted by the commission's Committee on Style and Drafting at its meeting
on March 1, 1978. The author attended this meeting as the representative of the attorney
general, who was a member of the commission by constitutional designation and was also a
member of the Style and Drafting Committee. The committee wanted to make certain that
wherever the word "person" was employed, it would not be construed judicially as including
corporations where only "natural persons" were meant.
154. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 152-53 (Jan. 11, 1978). Commissioner Dempsey
Barron, among others, was in substantial accord with the concept that the exemption should
also be made available to persons other than heads of families. See Transcript of Fla. C.R.C.
proceedings 239-40 (Dec. 9, 1977).
155. For whatever reason, the commission debate on this change at times reflects a lack
of understanding of current homestead law. For example, Commissioners Yvonne Burkholz
and Stella Thayer at one point agreed that Florida's current homestead protection "would
not include a divorced mother and children," Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 243 (Dec.
9, 1977); Commissioner John Ware appears to have believed that the homestead protection
was originally designed only for families in law, and that extending the homestead exemption
to one not the head of a family was "an entirely new concept that we haven't even thought
about before," id. at 244. While the homestead article was being debated on the floor of the
commission, Commissioner Ware was called upon to explain the present state of homestead
law and accurately did so in admirably articulate fashion. Id. at 245.
156. In Dame, supra note 5, at 402, the author commented on the "head of a family"
requirement set forth in the then recent constitutional amendment regarding partial exemp-
tion of the homestead from taxation (now FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6, which no longer has the
"head of a family" language but says "[elvery person"), and offered the following definition
derived from Florida case law on the forced sale exemption:
The head of a family is that person who maintains a home and has some person,
as a member of the family living with him or her, who is to some extent dependent
upon and recognizes the head of the family. One person is not a family; there must
be at least two persons, of whom one must be recognized by the other as the head
of the family.
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whether of a family in law'57 or of a family in fact. 5" The essential
criterion has been dependence on the person alleged to be the
"head" by the "family" members. 5 ' Examples of such dependence
affording a single person the exemption include a divorced woman
with a minor child, 60 a widow with a dependent adult daughter, "
a single man living with a dependent mother and the children of his
deceased sister, 6 ' and a divorced man whose family resided in Mas-
sachusetts and who purchased the "homestead" after his divorce., 3
Thus, as has been stated in connection with the 1973 amendment
of the Texas homestead realty exemption to include the homestead
"of a single adult person,"' 6' "the drastic change brought about by
the new law is not in the fact that single adults may now claim the
homestead exemption, but that such persons need no longer be a
head of a family or a surviving family member."'' 15 It therefore can-
157. A "family in law" is one in which the person claiming the exemption has a legal duty
to maintain the other member(s) of the family arising out of the familial relation. See, e.g.,
Deem v. Shinn, 297 So. 2d 611, 613 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974); In re Estate of Kionka,
113 So. 2d 603, 606-07 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959), aff'd, 121 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1960); Crosby
& Miller, supra note 2, at 24.
158. A "family in fact" is one in which there is a continual communal living in a relation
"in which an established and continuing personal authority, responsibility, and obligation
actually rests upon one as 'the head of a family' for the welfare of the others," who, in fact,
"recognize and observe a family relation to the one [claiming the exemption, or on whose
'behalf' the exemption is claimed] as the 'head of a family.'" Johns v. Bowden, 66 So. 155,
159 (Fla. 1914); accord, Heard v. Mathis, 344 So. 2d 651, 654 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Brown v. Hutch, 156 So. 2d 683, 684-85 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 162 So.
2d 665 (Fla. 1964); see Dame, supra note 5, at 402 (family member(s) must be dependent upon
and recognize the head of the family). Such a "family" must be one "in good faith." Adams
v. Clark, 37 So. 734, 736 (Fla. 1904).
159. E.g., Vandiver v. Vincent, 139 So. 2d 704, 708-09 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962); In re
Estate of Kionka, 113 So. 2d 603, 606-07 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959), aff'd, 121 So. 2d 644
(Fla. 1960); Dame, supra note 5, at 402-03; cf. Zimmerman v. Gardner, 355 So. 2d 157, 157
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (homestead exemption denied where claimant cared for nonre-
lated but invalid person, since the claimant could "terminate the relationship at any time
she desires"). Factual dependence has not, however, been the sole criterion. Id.; Crosby &
Miller, supra note 2, at 26.
160. Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. 1950); Vandiver v. Vincent, 139 So.
2d 704, 709-10 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
161. Regero v. Daugherty, 69 So. 2d 178, 179-80 (Fla. 1953) (homestead for purposes of
restraints on devise).
162. Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 75 So. 614, 615, 617 (Fla. 1917).
163. Deem v. Shinn, 297 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (homestead for
purposes of restraints on devise). For other examples of situations in which single per-
sons-and particularly single women-have been declared the "head of a family," see Crosby
& Miller, supra note 2, at 25-26.
164. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
165. Note, Effects of Extending the Homestead Exemption to Single Adults, 26 BAYLOR
L. REv. 658, 658 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Baylor Note].
The change now under consideration in Florida goes beyond the legislative attempt to have
the "head'of-family status" devolve upon "the surviving tenant by the entirety or spouse of
the owner" for purposes of the forced sale exemption, irrespective of the fact that such
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not be doubted that Commissioner Burkholz's concern that di-
vorced women-and men-be entitled to the homestead exemption
will be met by making the exemption available to "any natural
person." With approval of the commission proposal, the balance
between creditors' and debtors' rights would be struck in favor of
all debtors' who own "homes.' 6 7
An interesting problem of construction would arise in the light of
this change should the Florida courts be faced with making a home-
stead determination in the case of two "natural persons"-with two
homesteads-who have married. Since a claimant can have only one
residence and so only one homestead, whose will it be?6 8 The courts
might, in such a case, turn to an examination of intent, but such
an examination would not suffice in all cases.
As an example, consider the interplay between this proposed
change and the commission's proposal to limit the 160-acre home-
stead to one "the acreage of which is used for agricultural purposes."
Suppose a farmer, with an "agricultural" homestead of 160 acres,
marries a teacher who resides on a one acre homestead, and both
continue in their respective occupations, each contributing to the
upkeep of the other's residence. Suppose further that this home-
stead couple lives in the teacher's home on weekdays during the
school year and in the farmer's home on weekends and during school
"surviving spouse" is not the head of a family in law or of a family in fact. FLA. STAT. §
222.19(2) (1977). This section is an obvious legislative attempt to declare that the require-
ments for head-of-family status are met by a single person in limited circumstances and is
in apparent conflict with those decisions of the Florida Supreme Court which have held that
a tenancy by the entirety "becomes upon the death of one spouse the sole property of the
remaining spouse to the exclusion of the heirs to the decedent," even though the property
was occupied as a homestead during the lifetime of both spouses. Denham v. Sexton, 48 So.
2d 416, 418 (Fla. 1950); accord, Williams v. Foerster, 335 So. 2d 810, 812 (Fla. 1976); Pace v.
Woods, 177 So. 2d 779, 780 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
166. See Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 247 (Dec. 9, 1977) (exchange between
Commissioners John Ware and Jon Moyle to the effect that the homestead exemption has
now been made available to a new class of debtors). However, nothing is certain in homestead
law except uncertainty. For example, the Vermont Supreme Court was confronted with a
situation in which claimed homestead realty became the subject of an inter vivos transfer
after that state's homestead law had been made available to "natural persons" as opposed
to "heads of family." In its discussion of the rights of the owner's spouse in the subject land,
the court all but ignored the recent legislative amendment: "The homestead right is a right
to be set out of the estate of the husband or head of the family and is treated as an exemption
of so much of his estate as is included within it, for the benefit of his widow after his decease."
Cole v. Cole, 91 A.2d 819, 824 (Vt. 1952) (emphasis added).
167. See Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 246 (Dec. 9, 1977) (remarks of Yvonne
Burkholz to the effect that the purpose of the homestead is to "protect the home site"
regardless of familial structure).
168. See, e.g., Sarahas v. Fenlon, 5 Kan. 360, 361 (1870); Crosby & Miller, supra note 2,
at 30-31, 37.
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vacation periods.' 5 To move to a consideration of which person in
such a case is the "family manager"'70 or the like, in order to deter-
mine which of the two homesteads is the homestead, would be to
dress the "head of a family" concept in new clothes. Since the
exemption is to be made available to any "natural persor4," it no
longer matters whether the farmer or the teacher is the "head" of
that family.
What does continue to matter is whether or not the claimed
homestead has been employed as a home and residence with an
"element of permanency."'' On the basis of these facts, either our
farmer's farm or our teacher's house could be held to be the home-
stead of both persons, and whether the farmer or the teacher is the
family head becomes irrelevant. The requisite use and ownership
are all that must be established in order to claim either homestead
realty exemption potentially available in this situation. Thus,
should our married couple cease living together entirely and each
return to his or her pre-matrimonial residence, or should each pur-
chase and move into an entirely new home separate from the other,
it would not matter whether one was factually or legally dependent
on the other for purposes of the homestead exemption. The exemp-
tion will become available to either "natural person."
It is, after all, a fundamental doctrine of existing homestead law
that the facts of each case are to be interpreted so as to carry out
the purpose of the homestead exemption, so long as such an inter-
pretation does not serve as the instrument of fraud. " The proposed
169. This example is drawn from Baylor Note, supra note 165, at 668, raising a factual
situation similar to that stated in the text and posing many other such questions in light of
the 1973 amendment to the Texas Constitution which made the homestead exemption in that
state available to "a single adult person" as well as to heads of families.
170. This has been posited as a "new legal preference" in Baylor Note, supra note 165, at
668.
171. E.g., Bigelow v. Dunphe, 197 So. 328, 330 (Fla. 1940); Oliver v. Snowden, 18 Fla.
823, 835-36 (1882); In re Estate of Van Meter, 214 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1968), cert. discharged, 231 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1970); see Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81, 153 (1857)
(stating, with regard to a choice of laws problem regarding intestate succession, that "[t]o
speak of a permanent home is to perpetrate a tautology-to speak of a temporary home is to
involve a contradiction of terms" (emphasis in original). The employment of this test is
illustrated by the discussion in Crosby & Miller, supra note 2, at 40-47. Whether a claimed
"agricultural" homestead will be found in a case where the owner's family resides thereon
without the owner is open to question. See text accompanying notes 175-79 infra.
172. E.g., Bigelow v. Dunphe, 197 So. 328, 329-30 (Fla. 1940); Deem v. Shinn, 297 So. 2d
611, 613 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Vandiver v. Vincent, 139 So. 2d 704, 708 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1962). Thus, in the case of Beensen v. Burgess, 218 So. 2d 517, 518-19 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1969), the court sustained a claim of homestead exemption for purposes of forced
sale where a father (and head of a family) left his claimed homestead and moved in with his
married daughter, whose husband was the head of that family, although the court noted that
the exemption would have been denied had there been a factual determination that the
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change from "head of a family" to "natural person" indicates that
the purpose of the revised homestead exemption would be to protect
the homesteads of all persons without regard to marital or familial
status. In any case, creditors are presumed to be aware of the law
setting forth the homestead exemption, and the burden is upon
them to see that their interests are adequately secured.'
B. One-Hundred Sixty Acres, "the acreage of which is used for
agricultural purposes, " or "one acre, limited to the residence of the
owner or his family"
This proposal is part of a broader change eliminating the rural-
urban homestead distinction. So long as the acreage upon which the
homestead rests (with a maximum of 160 acres) is used for
"agricultural" purposes, "whether it is in the municipality or out-
side the municipality, . . . you are going to get 160 acres, one-
quarter of a section.""' This proposal would alter the settled doc-
trine that the use to which a rural homestead is put is irrelevant to
the availability of the exemption.' In contrast, the proposal would
retain the limitation "to the residence of the owner or his family"
for what were "municipal" homesteads and are now "non-
agricultural" ones, although the maximum protected acreage of
such homesteads has doubled from one-half acre to one acre.
This proposed revision also contains a constructional ambiguity
as to whether the owner is required to reside on the real property
claimed as homestead, an ambiguity previously contained in the
daughter's home had become the claimant's "permanent abode at the time ne moved
in .... " Id. at 519.
173. As stated by the Florida Supreme Court in Patterson v. Taylor, 15 Fla. 336, 347
(1875):
It is a humane provision that men and families, through misfortune, shall not be
stripped of the little property necessary to their comfort and subsistence, and when
one gives credit by lending money or selling goods without security, he does so in
view of the laws exempting certain property from forced sale, and the creditor
cannot complain, for he extends credit with full knowledge of the rights of the
debtor and his family, relying alone upon his remedy at law.
Accord, Bigelow v. Dunphe, 197 So. 328, 330 (Fla. 1940); see Reed v. Fain, 145 So. 2d 858,
864, 867 (Fla. 1962) (one can be an "innocent third party" in a transfer of homestead property
"owned by the head of a family with a child or children then living" only by taking a deed or
mortgage executed by both spouses in exchange for a valuable consideration or "by acquisi-
tion of a valid tax deed").
174. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 160 (Jan. 11, 1978) (remarks of Jesse
McCrary).
175. E.g., Fort v. Rigdon, 129 So. 847, 848 (Fla. 1930); McDougall v. Meginniss, 21 Fla.
362, 372 (1885); Estate of Thornton v. Bretan, 259 So. 2d 760, 761 & n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1971).
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1868, 1885 and 1968 Florida Constitutions.' 6 One commentator has
noted with regard to the present Florida Constitution that
there is no express requirement that the homestead owner him-
self reside on the premises, it seemingly being sufficient that his
family reside thereon. Nor is there an express provision that the
homestead owner even make his residence in the state, it again
seemingly being sufficient that his family reside on the Florida
homestead. "
While no decision of the Florida courts has been found in which this
question was considered or decided, it would appear that the home-
stead real property exemptions from forced sale granted by the 1868,
1885 and 1968 Florida Constitutions implicitly required that the
owner of the claimed homestead reside on the premises. 17  Presum-
ably, this implicit requirement will continue should the proposal
under consideration be adopted by the voters at the forthcoming
election. How the phrase "the acreage of which is used for agricul-
tural purposes" will be interpreted is another question.
A Wisconsin statute enacted in 1848 contained the phrase "used
for agricultural purposes" in connection with the requirements for
establishing a rural homestead in that state.'79 However, as the Wis-
consin Supreme Court noted in Binzel v. Grogan,'0 the Wisconsin
176. The 1868 Florida Constitution expressly required that the owner reside on the prem-
ises if the exemption was claimed on property located in a city or town, FLA. CONST. of 1868,
art. IX, § 1, as did the 1885 Florida Constitution, FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 1.
177. 1 R.E. BoYEa, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 474.15-16 (1977).
178. See I FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY PRACTICE 541 (Fla. Bar 2d ed. 1971); Crosby & Miller,
supra note 2, at 17-18, 23. It has been held, for example, that "[real property ... can only
be homestead for the purpose of descent and distribution if it is owned by the head of a family
residing on the property at the time of death." Jablonski v. Caputo, 297 So. 2d 310, 311 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). Since it is the exemption from forced sale for debts of the deceased
owner, as distinct from the realty, that descends under the constitutional homestead provi-
sions, e.g., Wilson v. Fridenburg, 19 Fla. 461, 465-66 (1882); Crosby & Miller, supra note 2,
at 54, by requiring that the deceased owner have resided on the property in order for the
exemption to inure, the Florida courts have implicitly required the owner to reside on the
property in order to claim the exemption for himself. If he does not reside on the property,
no exemption can inure after death for the simple reason that no exemption existed during
the owner's lifetime. As was ably stated in an opinion by Justice James Diament Westcott,
Jr., in which he reiterated on behalf of the court the homestead descent and distribution
provisions of the 1868 Florida Constitution (provisions reenacted in different form in the 1885
and 1968 Florida Constitutions), "[tihe exemption shall accrue to the heirs of the party
having enjoyed or taken the benefit of such exemption . Wilson v. Fridenburg, 19 Fla.
461, 465 (1882) (emphasis added.)
179. Crow, supra note 130, at 6; Schoetz, supra note 137, at 23. The phrase has since been
deleted. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815.20(1) (West 1977).
180. 29 N.W. 895, 897-98 (Wis. 1886). The court's decision comports with the weight of
judicial authority to the effect that, where an exemption statute is made applicable to an
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Constitution directed the state legislature to provide an exemption
law for all debtors. On this ground, the court rejected the
"agricultural use" limitation enacted by the legislature and con-
strued the exemption law as applying to all debtors, regardless of
the uses to which the homestead was put. 8' However, before resting
its decision on this basis, the court offered an interpretation of the
law as it stood, implying that such an interpretation would be con-
sonant with the liberal purposes of the exemption laws:
To ascertain the literal meaning of the words "agricultural pur-
poses" resort must be had to the lexicons for definitions of "agri-
culture." Webster tells us (accurately enough, no doubt) that it is
"the art or science of cultivating the ground, especially in fields or
in large quantities, including the preparation of the soil, the plant-
ing of seeds, the raising and harvesting of crops, and the rearing,
feeding, and management of live-stock; tillage, husbandry;
farming." The defendant did none of these things on his Sullivan
land, unless, perhaps, he kept and fed his horse there; and, if the
literal construction of the statute prevails, he had no homestead
rights in the property, unless the same were saved by the keeping
and feeding of the horse on the premises. If that was one of the
purposes for which he used the premises, it must be conceded, we
think, that they were used for one "agricultural purpose," at
least.
Since the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision rested on a state
constitutional provision having no analogue in the Florida Constitu-
tion, and although the court suggested that the offending clause
"may have crept into the law of 1848 as a mode (although perhaps
an awkward one) of expressing the distinction between city or vil-
lage property . . . and agricultural or country property,"'" it is
doubtful that Florida courts could take any other course than to
attempt to define this proposed new phrase. The change from past
"owner" or to "any person," it may be invoked by any claimant "regardless of family status."
Haskins, supra note 2, at 1293.
181. 29 N.W. at 898:
All that is required is that it be his homestead, and the statute was intended to
protect the owner in the enjoyment of it. The fisherman may build his home upon
the barren beach, using his land only for the spreading of his nets and the mooring
of his vessels; or the hunter may build his home in a forest, and make no use
whatever of his land appurtenant to his dwelling except to pass over it; yet we
entertain no doubt whatever that the legislature intended, by the enactment of
section 2983, to protect these men by exempting their homesteads from seizure for
debt. The same is true of the present case, where the debtor used his lands appur-
tenant to his residence exclusively in connection with his hotel business.
182. Id. at 897.
183. Id. at 899.
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homestead law in Florida-in which the rural-urban homestead dis-
tinction was explicitly made and is now avoided-is simply too large
to ignore.
The case law surrounding the homestead exemption in the Kan-
sas Constitution may offer a clue to the approach the Florida courts
might take in interpreting the change now under consideration. The
Kansas homestead realty exemption extends to 160 acres of
"farming land" on the one hand, or one acre in the city, so long as
the land is "occupied as a residence by the family of the owner
... ," The Kansas Supreme Court, in construing this provi-
sion, has developed a doctrine of "constructive use" of homestead
land:
[Sbo long as the whole tract is devoted to the purposes of a home-
stead, and not to any other purpose inconsistent with the owner's
homestead interests, the whole of the tract, up to 160 acres of
farming land, or one acre within the limits of an incorporated town
or city, will be considered as a part of the owner's homestead,
whether he actually uses every part and portion thereof or not.
Under such circumstances all is constructively used.'"
There is no reason not to import a constructive use doctrine into
Florida's proposed new "agricultural" (as distinct from "rural" or
"urban") homestead, so long as its application in a particular case
does not become an instrument of fraud. 186
If the Florida courts accepted and applied such a doctrine, the
effect would be to allow the agricultural exemption to be claimed
on a 160-acre homestead in its entirety, so long as some portion of
the acreage was put to agricultural use. The language of the exemp-
tion, however, provides that it may be claimed on a homestead to
the extent of 160 acres, so long as the acreage is used for agricultural
purposes, implying that the framers envisioned an agricultural
homestead coextensive with the acreage used for agricultural pur-
poses, with a maximum of 160 acres.
Given the specific use limitation in the change under considera-
184. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 9. That the case law construing this provision may provide
a point of reference for interpretation of Florida's new "agricultural" homestead is illustrated
by the language of the Kansas Supreme Court in the case of Sarahas v. Fenlon, 5 Kan. 360
(1870). The Sarahas court upheld a homestead claim as to the plaintiff's "farming land" and
denied it as to that portion of plaintiff's property which was located inside a municipality,
making reference at one point to "the unnecessary extension of city limits over lands which
could more appropriately be used for agricultural purposes ..... Id. at 362 (emphasis
added).
185. Morrissey v. Donohoe, 5 P. 27, 29 (Kan. 1884).
186. See note 172 supra.
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tion, the Florida courts may choose to resurrect an 1875 federal
circuit court decision by Justice Joseph Bradley. In Greeley v.
Scott, 187 Justice Bradley considered the meaning of the forced
sale exemption in the 1868 Florida Constitution of "[a] homestead
to the extent of one hundred and sixty acres of land. . . and the
improvements on the real estate. . . ."I" The court considered this
language as being intended to protect that quantity of real estate,
up to 160 acres, which was needed to carry on the debtor's usual
business or trade, and implied that this protection was written into
law primarily for the benefit of farmers.' Applying this reasoning
to the facts of the case before it, wherein a judgment debtor had
claimed the constitutional exemption upon a 40-acre tract, the
Greeley court allowed the exemption only upon the debtor's house
and a sawmill appurtenant thereto, the sawmill being the debtor's
principal place of business and the basis of his usual trade or
occupation.
The court declared in Greeley that to reach any other result would
protect a constructive use of homestead realty unwarranted by the
language of the exemption:
Otherwise, by multiplying his branches of business and trade, a
man might have a large domain consisting of many establish-
ments, and claim them all as incident to his homestead. This never
could have been the intent of the constitution. It would be an
unreasonable construction of its terms. Those terms must be fairly
construed so as to fully carry out the policy of the constitution, and
yet not to nullify all obligations of a debtor to pay his debts.,,"
Ten years later, in McDougall v. Meginniss, I the Florida Supreme
Court rejected both the holding and the rationale of Greeley on the
ground that the constitutional exemption in question contained no
limitation on the use to be made of the realty, a position to which
it has adhered since." 2 The change at hand would create a use
limitation on the maximum 160-acre forced sale exemption of a type
187. 10 F. Cas. 1072 (C.C.N.D. Fla. 1875).
188. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1.
189. 10 F. Cas. at 1072-73. In construing the constitutional exemption, the court appar-
ently had in mind the statutory exemptions from forced sale in existence in Florida from 1845,
which provided a real property exemption available only to farmers. See text accompanying
notes 117-21 supra. The court pointed out that "160 acres of land [was] the usual quantity
for a farm in this country. 10 F. Cas. at 1072.
190. 10 F. Cas. at 1073.
191. 21 Fla. 362, 371-72 (1885).
192. E.g., Armour & Co. v. Hulvey, 74 So. 212, 214 (Fla. 1917); Smith v. Guckenheimer,
27 So. 900, 904 (Fla. 1900).
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envisioned by the Fifth Circuit in Greeley. Whether the Florida
courts would approve the reasoning of the Greeley decision in the
light of this change, or whether they would turn to decisions such
as Binzel v. Grogan"3 construing analogous provisions of other state
constitutions is an open question.
Besides previously rejected federal case law, and decisions
construing analogous provisions of other state constitutions, aids in
construction of the phrase "the acreage of which is used for agricul-
tural purposes" include definitions of the term "agriculture" em-
ployed in Florida case law," 4 various statutory definitions of analo-
gous terms,9 5 and the case law construing statutes employing such
terms.'"1
Finally, Florida courts are very likely to accept an interpretation
of the Kansas Constitution, to the effect that growing crops are part
of the homestead per se, and not homestead personal property. 19 7
The Florida courts have come to the same conclusion under the
present wording of the Florida Constitution, 98 and it is unlikely that
the change in wording would change this construction. However, it
is noteworthy that the Kansas courts have included growing crops
within the homestead realty exemption by explicit reference to the
"farming land" language of that state's constitution, reasoning as
follows:
The purpose of the homestead exemption is to provide a place in
which a debtor and his family may live and to provide a place on
which he can raise food for his family without interference by
creditors. If crops sown by the occupant of a homestead be levied
on and sold while they are growing, one of the purposes of the
homestead exemption will be defeated."'9
Whether or not this explains the proposed change in Florida's
constitution is unclear from the commission debate on the subject.? °
193. 29 N.W. 895 (Wis. 1886).
194. E.g., Florida Indus. Comm'n v. Growers Equip. Co., 12 So. 2d 889,893-94 (Fla. 1943).
195. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 1.01(13) (1977) (setting forth a nonexclusive definition of, inter
alia, "agricultural purposes").
196. E.g., id. § 704.01(2) (providing for a statutory way of necessity for land located
outside a municipality and which, inter alia, is "used or desired to be used ... for agricul-
tural purposes. .. ").
197. C.C. Isely Lumber Co. v. Kitch, 256 P. 133, 135 (Kan. 1927).
198. See Crosby & Miller, supra note 2, at 22 & n.39, 77-78, and cases cited therein.
199. C.C. Isely Lumber Co. v. Kitch, 256 P. 133, 134 (Kan. 1927); accord, Estate of
Johnson v. Johnson, 452 P.2d 286, 297, modified on other grounds, 452 P.2d 301 (Kan. 1969).
200. This is in sharp contrast to the "business house" exemption granted under FLA.
CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 1, which generally was construed as referring to improvements
located on the homestead realty and used by the owner as a means of making a living without
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It appears that the move either to a maximum 160-acre homestead
"the acreage of which is used for agricultural purposes" on the one
hand, or to a maximum one-acre homestead on the other, was made
primarily to eliminate the rural-urban homestead distinction.",
There is also some indication that it was done to "take care of the
small farmer, 20 2 although at least one commissioner pointed out
that a person with a 160-acre farm within the limits of a municipal-
ity should not be diminutively characterized as a "small farmer. '203
Since it was also pointed out that the rural-urban homestead
distinction was originally made "when Florida was an agricultural
state and it meant something," ' one wonders why this particular
wording was chosen at all. Why, indeed, should a person who uses
160 acres of land surrounding his or her home for "agricultural pur-
poses" be granted an exemption on the entire tract, while a person
making use of far less acreage for other purposes-such as rental of
dwelling units located on the premises-is effectively limited to one
acre or "the residence of the owner or his family," whichever is less?
If the intent of this proposal is to allow a debtor to provide for self
and family, why not continue to allow a similar exemption to those
using one acre or more to care for self and family by means other
than agricultural? In any event, are not 160 acres of farm land
rather more than adequate for the task of providing for one's fam-
ily, let alone for oneself? Finally, what would the courts do, for
example, with the case of someone who owns a 160-acre tract, lives
on it alone, and profitably leases the acreage to a corporate orange
juice processor which uses the acreage for the agricultural purpose
of growing and processing oranges?
The truth of the matter is that this proposal makes no sense apart
from an understanding both of the present constitution and of tradi-
tional politics. Under the present constitution, a 160-acre tract (or
less) can be used for any purpose and receive the homestead exemp-
tion, so long as it is outside the limits of a municipality.205 If a
homestead is located inside a municipality, then it is-and has been
for some time-limited to the residence of the owner or his family,
interference by his or her creditors. See C. CRANDALL, supra note 4, at 853; Crosby & Miller,
supra note 2, at 43-45.
201. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 155-56 (Jan. 11, 1978) (remarks of Jesse
McCrary).
202. Id. at 158 (remarks of Jesse McCrary and Nat Reed).
203. Id. at 159 (remarks of Nat Reed).
204. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 240-41 (Dec. 9, 1977) (remarks of DuBose
Ausley). It appears that that the average size of a farm in the late nineteenth century was
160 acres. Greeley v. Scott, 10 F. Cas. 1072, 1072 (C.C.N.D. Fla. 1875).
205. McDougall v. Meginniss, 21 Fla. 362, 372 (1885).
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with a current maximum limitation of one-half acre. °0 This rural-
urban distinction is a rational one, on the theory that a person
residing outside a municipality would use his acreage to support his
family,207 and that a person residing in a municipality would need
only a place to live, since there is insufficient land within a munici-
pality-and especially inside a contemporary metropolis-for any
other purpose appropriate for the protection of the exemption
laws. 20 The proposed revision would eliminate this distinction and
the reasoning which supports it.
In the future, under the commission proposal, a claimed home-
stead of 160 acres would have to be an "agricultural" one in the
sense that all 160 acres are used for agricultural purposes. If not,
unless the Florida courts adopt the "constructive use" doctrine,
only that portion judicially determined to be used for agricultural
purposes would be exempt from execution and forced sale. Ob-
viously, this change would place a more restrictive limitation on the
availability of the homestead exemption in rural areas. But why, it
may be asked once again, retain the 160-acre exemption in Florida
at all, especially considering the fact that a Wisconsin farmer, for
example, was considered capable of supporting his family on a max-
imum of forty acres?201
The reason can be found in pragmatic politics. The commission
has sought to reduce the availability of the 160-acre maximum ex-
emption. Had it reduced the available acreage as well, the proposal
might be defeated .2 1 Given this, it follows that the "agricultural"
206. Thus, in Weiss v. Stone, 220 So. 2d 403, 404-05 n.2, 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
appeal dismissed, 225 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1969), the trial court's determination that a homestead
existed in an apartment building located in a municipality-but only to the extent of the
building owner's own apartment or "residence"-was upheld, the rest of the building being
held subject to forced sale. Contrast this view with that recently taken by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court that rental income from buildings located on an otherwise exempt homestead
should be included within the homestead realty exemption, despite lack of constitutional or
statutory authority therefor, because of the liberal purposes of the homestead laws and
because "the exemption applies regardless of what uses to which [the judgment debtor] puts
the land." Schwanz v. Teper, 223 N.W.2d 896, 900-01 (Wis. 1974).
207. See C. CRANDAL, supra note 4, at 853, where it is stated that the exemption of both
rural and urban homesteads under the 1885 constitution was intended "[to enable the
defendant to be self-supporting and to prevent him and his family from becoming public
charges .... " Although the rural homestead exemption has remained essentially the
same since Professor Crandall made this statement, it should be noted that the 1885 consti-
tution's exemption of "the residence or business house of the owner" in a municipality was
revised in 1968 to provide a municipal homestead exemption only to the extent of "the
residence of the owner or his family." Compare FiA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 1 with FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
208. See notes 96, 207 supra.
209. See Act of July 29, 1848, § 1, 1848 Wis. Laws 40 (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 815.20(1) (West 1977)).
210. The acrimonious and irrational debate which would have then taken place is re-
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exemption should be given a literal interpretation, unhampered by
reference to any purpose other than the protection of every "natural
person" whose home happens to be located on a quarter section,
"the acreage of which is used for agricultural purposes."
C. "Mobile or modular home maintained as the residence of the
owner or his family"
Commissioner Yvonne Burkholz, the author of this proposal, ex-
plained that her intent was to extend the homestead realty exemp-
tion to a mobile or modular home which serves as "the permanent
residence of the owner. . ". .. " In this sense, the phrase
"maintained as the residence" may be used in contrast to a phrase
such as "owned by the person claiming the exemption." This makes
clear that the exemption is not limited to cases in which the mobile
or modular home owner also has title to the underlying realty.2 12 The
commission debate on this proposal clearly reflects that this exemp-
tion was included as part of the homestead realty provisions and not
as part of the homestead personalty section .2 Given the expression
of intent that "maintained as the residence of the owner or his
family 2 14 means one's "permanent residence," it is likely that the
flected in the Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 237-39 (Dec. 9, 1977), in which Commis-
sioner Dexter Douglass bitterly accused Commissioner DuBose Ausley of an unexplained
prejudice against all of North Florida after Commissioner Ausley proposed that all homestead
realty exemptions be limited to three acres. Both men, it should be added, are from North
Florida.
211. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 172 (Jan. 13, 1978) (remarks of Yvonne Burk-
holz).
212. See id. at 169, where Commissioner Dempsey Barron responded to an amendment
by Commissioner Jon Moyle that would have limited the exemption as indicated in the text:
What we are attempting to reach is to say if someone gets a judgment against you,
they cannot take your home. And if you adopt the amendment of Commissioner
Moyle, then the law would be if you could not afford the lot that your mobile home
was on, they could get a judgment and get your mobile home.
It's still your home. That would be a terrible thing to do. I don't think we really
want to do that.
213. Commissioner John Ware pointed out that, as originally drafted, this proposal would
have been included in the homestead personalty section, and so would be subject to the
$1,000 (now $3,000, as proposed by the commission) monetary maximum set forth in that
section. Id. at 74. Although Commissioner Yvonne Burkholz, id. at 72, and Commission
Chairman Talbot D'Alemberte, id. at 75, were respectively of the view that inclusion in the
homestead per se section rather than in the homestead personalty section "doesn't really
matter" and would not be "rather controversial to the Commission," the change in the realty
section was made.
214. How the phrase "or his family" came into this proposal, No. 150 on the commission
docket, is a mystery. Commissoner Yvonne Burkholz noted that her original amendment,
Amendment No. 1 to Proposal No. 150, did not contain this phrase, and she suggested that
her revised amendment, Amendment No. 3 to Proposal No. 150, had been so altered by
"staff." Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 172 (Jan. 13, 1978). No action was taken to
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Florida courts would interpret this phrase as they would for any
other claimed homestead, just as other state courts have interpreted
analogous revisions of their own homestead laws to require a perma-
nent occupation of the premises in order to claim the exemption.', 5
This change is based on statutory exemptions from forced sale
which have recently been amended to include mobile and modular
homes."' The Florida Legislature first interpreted the coverage of
the corresponding constitutional exemptions in 1869, providing in
part here pertinent for a declaration of homestead prior to levy;" 7 a
declaration of homestead after levy has been made;"' an explicit
extension of the above provisions to "[a]ny person owning and
occupying any dwelling-house [on] land not his own," which house
is rightfully possessed "by lease or otherwise" and is claimed as the
owner's homestead;21 1 and a procedure for the inventory and ap-
praisal of exempted personal property selected by the debtor.22 The
provisions for a declaration of homestead and the protection of a
"dwelling-house" located on land held "by lease or otherwise" per-
tained to interests in realty, and all of the provisions just discussed
were brought forward in substantially unchanged form through
1976.221
In 1977, mobile and modular homes were added to the statutes
providing for a declaration of homestead in realty.22 This 1977 sta-
tutory amendment thus constitutes a declaration by the Florida
Legislature that the constitutional and statutory exemptions of
realty from forced sale include mobile and modular homes. This
raises a question of constitutionality, a question not yet considered
or decided by the Florida courts, as to whether the legislature may
delete this phrase on an apparently long, wearying afternoon, and so it now appears as part
of the proposed Florida Constitution.
215. Thus, the Vermont Supreme Court noted that protection of a homestead "used or
kept" by the head of a family was the same as one merely "used" by such a claimant prior
to an amendment of the homestead statute inserting the words "or kept." The court stated
that "kept" in this context meant "an actual keeping," i.e., "a keeping of the premises with
a present right and purpose of using them as a family home." Keyes v. Bump, 9 A. 598, 599
(Vt. 1887). Although never revised in this regard, the Kansas Constitution has similarly
required that the claimed homestead be "occupied as a residence by the owner," and the
Kansas Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that "it must appear from the circum-
stances that an absence, in fact, is genuinely temporary, or the homestead privilege is lost."
Quinton v. Adams, 112 P. 95, 96 (Kan. 1910).
216. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 172 (Jan. 13, 1978).
217. Ch. 1715, § 1, 1869 Fla. Laws 26.
218. Id. § 2.
219. Id. § 5.
220. Id. §§ 7-8.
221. See FLA. STAT. §§ 222.01-.02, .05-07 (1977). No amendments to these statutes were
passed by the 1976 legislature.
222. Ch. 77-299, §§ 2-3, 1977 Fla. Laws 1305 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 222,01-.02 (1977)).
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authoritatively declare that the constitutional exemption of realty
from forced sale extends to property which is otherwise often consid-
ered personal in nature.2 23 This same question arises about the great
majority of mobile and modular homes, those used as a residence
by the owner on land not his or her own, for the 1977 Florida Legisla-
ture also declared that the exemption of a "dwelling house" located
on land lawfully possessed "by lease or otherwise" would include "a
mobile home used as a residence, or [a] modular home ....
2M. An analogous question arose in connection with the homestead tax exemption con-
tained in FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 7. This constitutional exemption was available "to
every person who has the legal title or beneficial title in equity to real property in this State,
under the conditions specified therein." Ammerman v. Markham, 222 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla.
1969) (emphasis in original). By the terms of the 1967 Laws of Florida, ch. 67-339, the Florida
Legislature declared that the homestead tax exemption was henceforth to be allowed on
cooperative apartments and condominiums. Since cooperative apartments were not (and are
not) otherwise considered interests in realty, it would at first glance appear that the legisla-
ture had effectively declared cooperative apartment ownership to be ownership of realty.
However, while the exemption was to be "allowed on each apartment occupied by a tenant-
stockholder or member of a cooperative apartment corporation," the legislature further pro-
vided that "[a] corporation leasing land for a term of ninety-eight (98) years or more for the
purpose of maintaining and operating a cooperative apartment thereon shall be deemed the
owner for purposes of this exemption." Ch. 67-339, § 1, 1967 Fla. Laws 1078 (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court of Florida, without consideration of the above-quoted under-
scored language, declared that
The Legislature by enacting Ch. 67-339 intended to and did include cooperative
and condominium apartments within the meaning of the terms "real property" and
"dwelling house," as used in the Constitution.
This legislative approval of individual ownership of units in a multiple-dwelling
structure bears a reasonable relationship to the purposes of Art. X, § 7, Fla. Const.
1885. Ch. 67-339 is a valid legislative definition of "real property" and "dwelling
house," as used in the Constitution, so as to extend homestead tax exemption
benefits to owners of condominium and cooperative apartments ....
Ammerman v. Markham, 222 So. 2d at 426. In other words, the court viewed ch. 67-339 as a
valid and express legislative definition of the terms "real property" and "dwelling house"
within the meaning of FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 7, and construed ch. 67-339 as extending
the constitutional exemption to the individual owners of cooperative apartments. Ammerman
formed the basis of the Florida Attorney General's subsequent opinion to the effect that the
owner of a modular home which is located on land held under lease "would not have 'the legal
or equitable title to real estate' under Florida law requiring such for homestead [tax] exemp-
tion," in the absence of either contrary judicial decision or "an express legislative definition
. . 1" [1969-70] FLA. Op. Arr'y GEN. 288, 289. While it might be contended that
the 1977 amendments discussed in the text constitute an express legislative definition of
"land," "improvements," and "residence" for the purposes of the forced sale exemptions
found in FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1), whether Ammerman can be used as support for the
validity thereof (assuming the Florida Supreme Court will continue to adhere to even its
limited holding) remains to be seen.
224. Ch. 77-299, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 1305; see In re Estate of Wartels, 357 So. 2d 708,
710-11 (Fla. 1978), in which the court held that a cooperative apartment is not homestead
property for purposes of statutes regulating devise and descent and distinguished Ammer-
man, see note 223 supra, on the ground that Ammerman "did not clothe cooperative apart-
ments with homestead status; it merely sustained the statutory implementation" of the
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Answers to these questions will affect the more than 400,000 owners
of mobile or modular homes in Florida."' These answers need not
be provided, however, if the proposal under consideration is adopted
at the forthcoming election. The constitution would then explicitly
provide that the constitutional exemptions of realty from forced sale
are to include mobile and modular homes.
One interesting problem of construction might arise should a
homestead claimant argue that his or her houseboat is a "mobile
home. ' 26 Although Commissioner Burkholz stated that the term
"modular home" was inserted to conform her amendment to "the
statute which refers to mobile and modular [homes], ' 227 she also
stated that the amendment was offered in "recognition of the vast
number of Florida residents whose homes are mobile and who
should have that exemption granted if the exemption is granted to
other citizens."' 5 Clearly, a houseboat or other watercraft used as a
home is "a home which is mobile."
At least one court has stated that a houseboat is a "mobile home"
for purposes of a homestead exemption containing that term, 29 and
constitutional homestead tax exemption. Regardless of the continued validity vel non of the
Florida Supreme Court decision in Ammerman v. Markham, the courts of this state are un-
likely to accept a legislative determination that personal property, of whatever type, should
be added to the explicit protections afforded real property by the forced sale exemptions of
the Florida Constitution. See State ex rel. West v. Butler, 69 So. 771, 777 (Fla. 1915):
Express or implied provisions of the Constitution cannot be altered, contracted
or enlarged by legislative enactments. A legislative construction of an ambiguous
or uncertain provision of organic law may be persuasive; but constitutional provi-
sions that are clear and explicit in terms or made so by the history of their adoption
and by long-continued application and recognition in governmental proceedings
cannot be given by legislation a meaning that conflicts with the terms of such clear
and explicit provisions.
Accord, State ex rel. Collier Land Inv. Corp. v. Dickinson, 188 So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. 1966);
[1976] FLA. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 198; [1973] FLA. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 217.
225. This figure is an estimate based on vehicle tag sales. FLORIDA DEP'T OF HIGHWAY
SAFMYr i AND MOTOR VEImCEs, TAGS AND REvENuE, July 1, 1976-June 30, 1977, at 63 (1977).
226. The 30-year-old conclusion of the Florida Attorney General's Office to the effect that
a houseboat is not a "homestead" for purposes of exemption from taxation, [1947-48] FLA.
Op. AT' GEN. 195, is of no bearing on this question. That opinion relates to FLA. CONST. of
1885, art. X, § 7 (now FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6), which explicitly exempts a certain amount
in value of real property legally or equitably owned by the claimant. The change now under
consideration in the text contains no such explicit requirement.
227. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 172 (Jan. 13, 1978). Commissioner Burkholz
was apparently referring to FLA. STAT. §§ 222.01-.02, .05 (1977), providing, inter alia, an
exemption from forced sale to the owner of a mobile or modular home whether or not the
owner-claimant holds title to the underlying realty.
228. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 71 (Jan. 13, 1978) (emphasis added).
229. In re Bell, 181 F. Supp. 387 (D. Or. 1960). The court reached this conclusion as
follows: "I am of the opinion that the houseboat is a mobile home as mentioned in ORS
23.164. Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Edition, defines mobile as, '1. capable
of being moved; movable.'" Id. at 387. The Oregon Legislature has since accepted this
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the California Assembly has extended its state's homestead laws to
this effect.no So long as the watercraft-home is owned and actually
occupied as a residence, as is required of every other claimed home-
stead, there can be no basis in law or in logic to deny the claim. To
construe the phrase "mobile home" as including waterborne homes
would clearly serve the purposes of Florida's historically expanding
homestead protection. As one California court has explained the
similarly expanding development of homestead law in that state:
A historical look recalls that at the time of the original constitu-
tional provision there were no mobile or transient "homes"; that a
homestead was the real property and building upon it occupied by
the family for its abode and residence ....
Many years later families began occupying mobile homes as
their places of residence and the need arose for protecting those
families against execution sale of such structures. . . . [Tihe
Legislature began in 1949 to create exemptions for house trailers
(mobile homes); and from time to time increased the amount of
exemptions thereon as they increased the exemptions under the
Civil Code homestead provisions. 31
Given this historical development-and Florida's long coast-
line-the Florida courts need not and should not construe the term
"mobile home" as being defined by the term "modular home" with
which it is disjunctively linked, so that only mobile homes located
on land would be within the exemption. Since homestead laws are
meant to protect a debtor's actual home, and since the facts of each
case should be construed in the light of this purpose, the homestead
protection could be construed, should the commission proposal be
adopted, as extending to homes located on water as well as on land
without doing noticeable violence to rules of construction.2 2 At any
decision by declaring that a "mobile home" for purposes of the Oregon homestead law
"includes, but is not limited to, a houseboat." OR. Rav. STAT. § 23.164(9) (1977).
230. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 690.3(a) (West Supp. 1978), exempts, inter alia, a "house-
boat, boat, or other waterborne vessel" in which the debtor or his family "actually resides"
from execution and forced sale.
231. Taylor v. Madigan, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376, 392-93 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (foot-
notes omitted).
232. Such a construction not only would be in line with the liberal "legislative" develop-
ments in homestead law over time but also would be in accord with the recent trend on the
part of Florida courts to consider condominiums as homesteads for purposes of the forced sale
exemption. Although by no means fully developed, and not clearly stated as yet, this trend
began with the recent decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Avila S. Condominium As8'n
v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977). In that case, individual condominium unit owners
alleged that the enforcement of liens on their respective units which secured payment of a
recreational lease and were held by the association would violate the homestead provisions
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rate, if this change is adopted, Florida would be among a growing
number of states allowing the homestead per se exemption to be
claimed by the owner-occupant of a "mobile" home,233 and, further,
would elevate this exemption from statutory to constitutional sta-
tus.
D. "Three thousand dollars" of Personal Property
The final significant proposed change in Florida's homestead pro-
vision is a proposed $2,000 increase in the amount of exempt per-
sonal property. This change, like all constitutional exemptions of
personal property from forced sale in Florida since 1868, and like the
constitutional and statutory provisions of many other states, would
allow the judgment debtor, subject to a monetary limitation, to
select the personal property upon which to claim the exemption.
Unlike the constitutional and statutory provisions of many other
states, and unlike the statutory exemption available in Florida prior
of the Florida Constitution. The court did not reject the plaintiff's constitutional claim but
instead directed that these plaintiffs be given leave to amend this count of their complaint
on remand, stating:
In order to avail himself of the homestead exemption, however, a debtor must
establish the homestead character of his property as of the time the lien attaches.
The complaint in the present case fails to allege facts that would qualify any unit
as homestead property, as of the time of the creation of the liens.
Id. at 605 (emphasis added). On the authority of Avila South, the Third District Court of
Appeal subsequently remanded another case with leave to amend a similar complaint on this
same issue. Point E. One Condominium Corp. v. Point E. Developers, Inc., 348 So. 2d 32,
36-37 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Another case in this developing trend is that of In re
Estate of Wartels, 357 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1978), in which the Florida Supreme Court carefully
distinguished condominium and cooperative apartment ownership in holding that a coopera-
tive apartment is not a constitutional homestead for purposes of descent: "Unlike a condomi-
nium purchaser, a cooperative apartment unit purchaser does not receive title to the coopera-
tive apartment unit, nor does he become entitled to ownership of any portion of the building
or the land upon which the cooperative apartment unit is situated." Id. at 709. Although
this recent trend on the part of Florida courts to consider condominiums as homesteads for
purposes of the exemption from forced sale may be viewed as an application of the rule that
exemption laws are to be construed "liberally," it should be noted that there is ample author-
ity for considering condominium ownership as ownership of an interest in realty. E.g., [1963-
641 FLA. Op. ATr'v GEN. 39; [1961-62] FLA. Op. AT'y GEN. 319, see Gautier v. State ex rel.
Safra, 127 So. 2d 683, 684-85 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 135 So. 2d 740
(Fla. 1961) (ownership of a dwelling unit within a multi-unit condominium held to be owner-
ship of part of a "dwelling house" and so impliedly "legal title or beneficial title in equity to
real property" within homestead tax exemption provision, FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 7);
cf. Overstreet v. Tubin, 53 So. 2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1951) (same as to each unit in a duplex,
ownership of entire structure being in two parties with each owning a divided one-half of
structure in fee simple).
233. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 690.3(a) (West Supp. 1978); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-54-
102(1)(O)(I)-(II) (1973 & Supp. 1976); MmIN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(1), (12) (West Supp. 1978);
OR. REv. STAT. § 23.164(1), (6), (9) (1977); Wyo. STAT. § 1-20-104 (1977). In addition, Kansas
law treats a "house trailer" as a homestead for the purpose of being "wholly exempt from
distribution ... ." KA. STAT. ANN. § 59-401 (1976).
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to the 1868 Florida Constitution,24 the judgment debtor would not
be restricted to enumerated items. It appears that $3,000 was chosen
as the new monetary maximum on this exemption in order to make
the exemption "a little more equitable. 2
35
A proposal to raise the limitation to $5,000 was withdrawn with-
out apparent debate, 2  and another proposal to raise the exemption
by only $1,500 was rejected.27 Beyond general expressions of doing
equity, 23 8 no reason appears why the exact figure of three thousand
dollars was chosen. The commission could have keyed this figure to
a consumer price index, but the availability of this option appears
never to have been discussed. Had it adopted this device, so that
the amount of the exemption would rise or fall with the rate of
inflation, Florida would apparently have been the first state in the
nation to do 80.239
The reason is a simple one: while eighteen of the thirty-seven
commissioners were attorneys, none identified themselves as econo-
mists. They were chosen, in large part, to reflect the wishes of the
people, and they have done so. Given the present vague feeling that
the homestead personalty exemption of $1,000 should be changed
and that a dollar is not worth what it was in 1885 when the $1,000
maximum first appeared, it is no wonder that the figure of $3,000
was chosen arbitrarily. 240
234. See text accompanying notes 80-85 supra.
235. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 234-35 (Dec. 9, 1977) (remarks of DuBose
Ausley). Proposals to increase the present monetary limitation have an intriguing origin:
One of the things that brought this to our attention is the fact that Commissioner
McCrary, who was familiar with the problem in Dade County where a child fell
down a well on a farm and was killed, and a judgment was obtained; and they were
unable to levy that judgment for the wrongful death of that child against the owner
of that property because it was 160 acres and a homestead, even though it was worth
thousands of dollars an acre.
What we have tried to do is eliminate the discrimination that exists between a
city residence and a county [sic] residence, and also provide a higher exemption
for the people who don't own any land.
Right now there is a thousand dollar exemption in the constitution. And the poor
man living down here in the Jefferson Arms Apartments and has a car worth $2,000,
is going to have that car levied on and sold at forced sale, even though the rich man
living on 160 acres in the county [sic], you are not going to be able to touch him.
Id. It apparently did not at all appeal to the commission to "make things a little more
equitable" by reducing the exemptions available to everyone.
236. Fla. C.R.C., Proposal No. 80 (by Commissioner McCrary), withdrawn, 25 Fla. C.R.C.
Jour. 353 (Jan. 27, 1978).
237. Amendment No. 1 to Proposal No. 83, by the Committee on Finance and Taxation,
failed viva voce. 15 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 242 (Dec. 9, 1977).
238. See Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 248 (Dec. 9, 1977) (remarks of Dempsey
Barron).
239. See Vukowich, supra note 92, at 797.
240. The Florida Constitution of 1868, in which homestead exemptions were established
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It was this sort of continual casting and recasting of the mold of
debtors' rights, reflecting the desires of a particular people at a
particular time, that led a Roman emperor to introduce voluntary
bankruptcy into Roman law2" ' and that led to the statutory intro-
duction of the writ of elegit into English law, to allow execution on
only one-half of the judgment debtor's lands and only for posses-
sion.2 2 It is, in short, a part of the continuing historical expansion
of debtors' rights resulting from a sometimes unarticulated societal
determination that debtors deserve protection and that creditors
must take a risk.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The homestead proposals of the 1978 Florida Constitution Revi-
sion Commission add yet another chapter to the historical process
of balancing debtors' and creditors' rights. They at once restrict and
expand the exemptions currently available. For example, the ex-
emption of real property up to 160 acres has now been coupled with
a restriction on protected land use. On the other hand, mobile and
modular homes have been given the constitutional protections pre-
viously afforded to real property in this state.
Whether these proposals, taken as a whole, strike a desirable
balance between the competing interests of judgment creditors and
debtors depends as a practical matter on where one's sympathies lie.
Fortunately or unfortunately, the apparent popular conception of a
debtor hounded by rapacious creditors is not universally accurate.
Many debtors seek to avoid the obligations resulting from financial
transactions into which they have freely entered. Moreover, without
the availability of security for the repayment of debts, the extension
for the first time as part of Florida's organic law, provided for a maximum exemption of $2,000
worth of personal property. This figure was reduced to $1,000 in the Florida Constitution of
1885 and remained at $1,000 in the 1968 Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(2);
FA. CONST. of 1885, art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, §§ 1-2.
Much of the commission's work was undertaken, perhaps necessarily, in a fashion which
was not calculated to please those who take the view that no portion of the constitution should
be changed without an exacting and considered deliberation. The author had the privilege of
observing the commission at work as an ad hoc member of its staff, on temporary leave from
the Department of Legal Affairs throughout the period of October, 1977, to February, 1978,
and as the representative of the attorney general of Florida at a meeting of the commission's
Style and Drafting Committee on March 1, 1978. As a minor illustration of the above point,
drawn from this experience, it was the author who suggested that if the title of article X, § 4
of the 1968 Florida Constitution were to be rephrased, that it might be rephrased as follows:
"Homestead- forced sale exemptions; restraints on devise and alienation." The committee
adopted this suggestion without question, and it was subsequently adopted by the full com-
mission. 26 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 468 (Mar. 6, 1978). See also notes 155, 210, 213-14 sipra.
241. See note 19 and text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
242. See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
1978] HOMESTEAD AND HISTORY 925
of credit which is at the heart of most commercial affairs becomes
a risky and unappealing business.
Viewed objectively, the commission's work is incomplete and
somewhat haphazard. Its proposals are in large part the product of
feeling rather than reflection. On the whole, however, these propos-
als would extend the constitutional forced sale exemptions to per-
sons who are in need of them and remove them from the grasp of
those who perhaps do not need them. The voters of this state would
do well to adopt the commission's proposals, secure in the knowl-
edge that these changes are subject to the guiding influence and fair
interpretation of the Florida courts.

